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Perhaps no event of this decade has had a greater impact on
the conscience of the religious community of Greater Cleveland
than the riot that occurred in Hough in July 1966.
The events of that week supplied the central theme for scores
of sermons. The shock of those events sparked the involvement of
dozens of suburban congregations in the affairs of the inner city.
The impact of those events aroused hundreds of laymen living in
all parts of Cuyahoga County to a recognition that the problems
of Hough are the problems of the entire Cleveland community.
As time passes the actual events of such a week tend to be
enshrouded in a growing collection of r.manticized recollections
and misleading myths. This report is published in an effort to
mak~ aV~llable to a larger audience a chronology of the events
of that week and to offer an interpretation of why the riots oc-
curred.
The text of this report was written by Mr. Marc E. Lackritz
as a senior thesis. It was presented to the Faculty of the De-
partment of History and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, in partial fulfill-
ment of the Requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree. Mr.
Lackritz Is a resident of Shaker Heights and has had the oppor-
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"••• I am reminded as well of the
preambl~ to the Tale of Two Cities by
Charles Dickens which-alr-of you are
aware of, I am sure: tIt was the best
of times, it was the worst of times.
It was the age of wisdom; it was the
age of foolishness. It was the epoch
of belief, it was the epoch of in-
credulity. It was the Season of light,
it was the season of darkness. It was
the spring of hope. it was the winter
of despair. We had everything before
us. we had nothing before us.'"
--Former Mayor Ralph S. Locher,
testifying before the United
States Commission on Civil
Rights. April 1. 1966
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PREFACE
The Hough riots of 1966 hardly se~m to be a proper subject for a history thesis
in 1968. Historical perspective provided by detached observation of events and
their sUbsequent consequences is prohibited by the factor of time. Final conclu-
sions are necessarily relegated to the realm of conjecture and, therefore, histori-
cal analysis suffers in the purely academic sense. However. analysis, limited as
its perspective may be, is most pertinent on the subject of civil disorder.
OUr nation is presently faced by the gravest crisiS of its brief history.
Racial ingustice and second class status for black citizens have culminated in wide-
spread civil disorder that shakes the very foundations of our society. The events of
recent days -- the traglc assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the ur-
ban violence that followed in the wake of his death •• have once again demonstrated
the unwillingness of our country to give the bla~k people equal rlghtso ~111e the
resources of our nation are being diverted for projects such as an unpopular war
and an effort to place a man on the moon, millions of Americans who are black still
suffer the consequences of discrimination. The means by which these people seek to
attain equal status have been changing in recent years, accompanied in each case by
increased misunderstanding in the white community. Only greater knowledge will re-
sult in the understanding necessary for permanent racial harmony.
The summer of 1966 was crucial to the entire civil rights movement. Watts had
exploded the previous summer, and the great legislative gains achieved by the methods
of non-violent protest had not resulted in significant ~~ gains for the black
people. A new cry was heard in the black ghetto -. "Burn, baby, burn" -. that
threatened to alter the entire course of the civil rights movement in America. The
events in Cleveland in 1966 were certainly relevant to the decision facing the civil
rights movement as well as portentous of future civil disorder.
The diseussio~ in this thesis is limited only to Cleveland. Cleveland is sim~
ilar to many other metropolitan areas where disorder has erupted~ and many of the
causes for the riots of last summer delineated by the Advisory CommiSSion on Civil
Disorders abounded in Cleveland. The consequences of the riots there, however, were
very different from those in other cities, and so a careful study of the events in
Cleveland provides valuable insight into the problems and dilemmas facing other
riot-stricken urban centers.
This thesis, then, is an etiological study of the Hough riots. The causes of
the disorder are the central theme of the text, and consequences of the violence are
briefly discussed in the last chapter. Understanding by whites of the problems and
conditions of the black inetto today is funda~ntal to ~h@ir undpTs~anding of th~
principles and rationale of black power, the means advocated by new black leaders
for the black people to attain equality. Thus, the study of the Hough riots, de.
spite its lac~of prerequiSites for historical study in perspective, still merits
historical analysis because of its relevance to the struggle for equal black rights
today.
The bigotry which produces black ghettos like Hough debases everyone in
society its victims, its perpetrators, and in more subtle ways, those who ac-
quiesce in it.* Racism can no longer be tolerated in this country. Kenneth Clark,
the noted ~oclo1ogi5t, once said, "Negroes will not break out of the barriers of
the ghetto unless whites transcend the barriers of thtir own minds."•• The bar·





*Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto (NewYork, 1965), p. 6).
**Kenneth B. Clark, HDelisions of the White Liberal," ~~~ Magazine,
April 14, 1965, p. 136.
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I. HOUGH EXPLODES
It's a loaded gun, w81t1ng for
someone to pull the trigger.!
Riots start with small incidents. Small incidents are all that Is necessary
to ignite the tinder of latent frustrations and passions that have built up over
the years o In Cleveland. Ohio, the Houg~ riots Df July. 1966. certainly wQr~ no
exceptioro to the pattern.
The SeventyftNiners' cafe stood at the corner of East 79th Street and Hough
Avenue (see Appendix One for Hough diagram), the geographical center of the Hough
neighborhood. It was owned by the Feigenbaum brothers, Abe and Dave, both of whom
had experienced poor relationships with the surrounding black community. In Janu-
ary, 1966. someone had tried to set fire to their car. On Monday, July 18~ their
relations became much worse.
At about 5:00 P.M" Dave Feigenbaum ordered a prostitute who was in the bar
soliciting funds for a deceased prostitute's children to leave. The woman hesl c
tated, and soon the bar owner and the prostitute were exchanging curses and vul~
gArities o The woman finally did leaVe, but only after the tension had heightenedo
Customers present at the time said that Feigenbaum then muttered something about
serving Negroes. Later the same day. a Negro ~alked into the bar and bought ~ pi~t
of cheap wine o He also asked for a pitcher of ice water and a glasso Howev2I',
this request was denied by the owner who told the customer that since the sale was
a take-out item. he would not serve him any ice water. A young man in the bar at
this time then heard Feigenbaum tell the barmaid not to serve Hno niggers no
water (sic)." The customer who had just been denied the ice water arose and
shouted to his friends that he had been refused a drink of water o He angrily left
the bar, and in minutes a Sign scribbled on a brown paper bag which said o ffNo W3.ter
for Nlggers" adorned the front door of the bar. As news of the latest incident and
the earlier one sp~~ad, a crowd gathered outslde the cafe. A call to the polIce
was quickly placed by the owners, and they soon appea~d on the sidewalk in front
of thp ba.r. one armed with a pistol and the other armed with a Ilflt. The police
arrived after some delay, and suddenly the rioting erupted Hwith the explosive-
ness of a firebomb. N2
As the police attempted to disperse the crowd, the mob spread toward 79th
Street, and vandalism and looting became widespread and prevalent. Rocks and bricks
were thrown at police as well as storefront windows, and soon fires broke out in
many of the neighborhood establishments. Wire mesh grills were wrenched loose from
storefronts so that the stores could be looted and torchede Three ctlain grocery
stores, a "cut-rate" drug storey and an easy credit clothing company were among
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the first buildings to go up in flames. The worst damage occurred in the area bor-
dered by East 71st and East 93rd, and soon the police blocked off entrance to this
area from the outside. Specifically, the two block area between East 84th and East
86th received the heaviest damage, and it was reported that "so many businesses were
looted that the police could not keep an accurate account.")
Fires were soon spreading everywhere, but firemen were having difficulty get-
ting their vehicles through the crowd that lined the perimeter of the riot zone.
Even after penetrating the riot area, the firemen faced more problems as they were
pelted by rocks and bottles. Fire hoses were cut, and, despite police protection,
occasionally the firemen were ordered by their commanding officer to withdraw with
the admonition to Hlet it burn. n4 Police cruiser windows were smashed, tires were
slashed, and the policemen themselves were also objects of hurled missles.
The sbuuLing began amidst the vandalism and looLing, amI ::iUUII Lh~ area re::oeliluled
a battlefront. A mobile police command post was quickly established at the corner
of East 73rd and Hough Avenue, and the police hastily shot out the streetlights
when the post fell under attack by snipers in nearby apartments. Police Captain
James Birmingham described the Situation as "like the part in an old western where
you're caught in crossfire in a box canyon.n5
The rioting the first night seemed to reach its peak at midnight, at which
time every available policeman and patrol car was ordered to the area. Even 'alice
Chief Richard Wagner arrived on the scene, attired in a green golf shirt, work
pants, and armed with his own shotgun. In an effort to combat the dangerous situ-
ation, policemen entered homes along Hough Avenue to find the sources of gunfire.
Many private residences were entered DY force, and personal property waS occasion-
ally destroyed and individual rights neglected in the frantic searches which oc-
curred o In the heat of the rioting irrational behavior became the rule rather than
the exception.
Peopl~ w~r~ ord~red off the streets and into nearby buildings for their per-
sonal safety. OCcasionally this measure was ineffective. Mrs. Joyce Arnett, 26,
waS returning home at about 1,30 A.M. when she was ordered into a nearby apartment
by police. She became frantic about the safety of her three infant daughters who
were at home, and so she yelled from the second story window that she was going to
corne out. As she shouted shots were heard, and three bullets from an unkown as-
sassin hit her in the head and chest. She died on arrival at Mount Sinai Hospital,
the first victim of the riots. Police later explained that she had been caught in
a crossfire "between police and one of the many snipers lurking in the shadows of
the area."6 three other Negroes were shot and injured the first night before the
shooting stopped. A light rain began to fall in the early morning. and the wide-
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~pread Shoot1ng and looting ended at about 4:00 A.M.
The toll of the first night was not light. A woman had been killed, and three
persons had been injured by bullets. Seven pol1cemen and one fireman were injured
by thrown rocks, bottles, and other missles, and eight other people were treated
at hospitals for similar injuries. Fifty-three people were arrested for disorder-
ly conduct, looting, and throwing objects at police, and damage.!n the Hough area
was estimated to be almost a million dollars the next morning. 7 One patrolman who
was on the scene commented, "I was in London In the bombings of World War II --
thatUs what it was like here last night and that's what it locks like this morn-
ing. ft8 Police Chief Wagner ordered all the policemen to work indefinite twelve
hour shifts, and he prophetically declared that he felt his police "could contain
any further trouble.~9
The next morning attention focused on Mayor Ralph Locher to see what hisre-
~ponse would be to the previous night's activities. He said that he was not con-
sidering calling in the National Guard, but that he would not hesita~e to do So if
he thought that the ~ituatlun had moved out of control. He met for two hours with
his top advisers, and instructed Bertram Gardner, director of the Community Rela~
tions Board, and Barton Clausen, Urban Renewal director, to meet with community
leaders and submit recommendations for remedial action. An appeal was directed by
the mayor to "all responsible citizens~ of the Hough area to help restore normal-
eyolO Normalcy, however, was not soon to be found in Cleveland.
Tuesday in Hough found only the looters profiting from the activities of the
previous night. Many small businesses, some of which represented li.fetime invest-
ments~ were quickly picked bare by the plunderers. One resident of Hough claimed
that suits were being sold for ten dollars, scotch whiskey for three dollars a
fifth, wine for fifty cents a fifth, and prime beef at the low price of only a
collar and a quarter per pound. ll Even a policeman was seen carrying a pack of
flashlight batteries under his arm from a looted Hough store. The situation waS
definitely not under control.
At City Hall, the toll of the previous evening, the uncontrolled looting, and
the threat of new violenc~ that evening began to weigh heavi"ly on Mayor Locher. A~
about noon he talked with Governor James Rhodes and, from Locher~s own account, he
was given aSsurance by the governor's office that the National .Guard could arrive
by sundown. 12 In the hours that followed, Locher came under tremendous pressure to
request the governor to call up the Guard. Because he reasoned that the delays in
calling up the National Guard in both Watts and Chicago had cost so much in lives
and damage, and because of the preViously mentioned factors, Locher made the de~
C1s1on to request the National Guard at 3:30 that afternoon. Locher then called
the Governor, and Safety Director John McCormick later reported that the guardsmen
were supposed to arrive three hours after the order was given. 13 McCormick also
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stated that the City was ftprepared to meet force with force. We were on top of
the trouble that erupted after dark Monday ni8ht.~14
At 5:00 P.M•• the mayor reported that one thousand men were alerted and avail-
able. and that the callup action seemed to be the Hprudent. proper. and correct ac-
tion to take." It waS also announced at this time that all bars, taverns, and cafes
had been ordered to close ror the night. 15
Sundown arrived and the National Guard had still not appeared in Cleveland be-
cause of transportation difficulties. No convoy trucks were available to the lQ7th
Armored Cavalry Regiment. the unit ordered into Cleveland, since the unit had lent
many of its trucks to the 37th division. and they had been driven to Grayling. Mich-
igan. In the absence of the Guard. activities in the Hough area were resumed with
only slightly less enthusiasm than the night before p
The pattern was the same: looting, vandalism. and sniping& Armed police were
stationed at strategic roof locations around the area to prevent attacks from the
rioters, and the police command post was moved to East 79th and Hough, the scene of
the inciting incident the previous evening. This heavy show of force apparently
scattered gangs into the fringe areas, and so it became difficult for the police
to find the firesetters and looters. Many abandoned houses and commercial buildings
were torched. and police were post~d on fire trucks to prev~nt any injury to the
16firemen. Sixty-seven fire alarms were reported, and firemen battled some forty
fires, almost all of which appeared to have been set by the rioters. l7
Gunfire Tuesday night tapered off from Monday's activity, and fewer snipers
were encountered by the police. Isolated instances did occur, however, and another
person was killed oy gunfire. Percy Giles. 36. was on his way to help a fellow
Negro board up his place of business on Hough Avenue when he was shot in the back
of the head& Police explained that the victim was probably killed by a stray bul-
let from an exchange of gunfire between snipers and police. 18 He died later at
8.55 r.M. at Mount Sinai HospitalQ Two o~her men were shot and wounded later 1n the
night.
Finally. at 11~OO P.M., several hundred men of the l07th Armored Regiment ar-
rived in Cleveland. Armed with bayonet-tipped M-l rifles, the helmeted guardsmen
were sent 1n to reinforce the police command post and the surrounding area at mid_
might, after waiting an hour for ammunition to arrive. SimultaneOUSly in Columbus.
Governor Rhodes declared that ffa state of tumult, riot, and other emergency exists
in Cleveland&" He added that as many guardsmen as necessary to control the disorder
would be sent to the City.19
The Hough area was quiet after the troops were deployed. but the delay in
reaching Cleveland had been costlyo One man had been killed, and at least twenty.
four persons, 1ncluding twelve policemen and one fireman. were injured. Fire damage
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was considerable, and almost eighty persons were arrested for looting and disorderly
conduct. 20 And the damage was not yet over.
As Wednesday dawned on Hough Avenue, only one grocery store was left unscathed
and no open drug stores were to be found. Some neighborhood residents expressed hope
that the disorder would end soon, and surrounding neighborhoods took precautionary
steps to avert rioting in their areas. Area Council President Solomon Harge and Op~
portun1ty Center Co-ordinator Howard Reed led efforts in the adjacent impoverished
Central Area in an attempt to keep the violence from their region. Door~to·aoor
campaigns were instituted which implored "re~pon51ble ~e51dent5" to refrain from
partaking in the disorder. 21
Traffic ~as seat~d off on Hougn Aven~ between East 79th and East 93rd Streets.
Patrol forces of guardsmen were doubled, but they did not succeed in halting much of
the widespread looting that went on during the day. A hurled firebomb ignited an
apartment bUilding at East 7Jtd and Hough, but no other major fires were reported
during the day.22
DuBois Club activity in the form of pamphlets distributed in the Hough area
which criticized polioepractices was reported, and the news was qUickly met by a
report that police were investigating the backgrounds of some of the persons arrest-
ed to determine whether they were members of any extremist or militant organizations.
Folice also announced ~hat they were investigating poSSible links between subversive
groups and the widespread violence to determine whether the rioting was organized
and by whom. 23
Mayor Locher conferred with the head of the National Guard contingent~ ohio Ad-
jutant General Erwin C. Hostetlpr, And lAter ~nnounced that the guard manpower was
being increased to 1700 men. He added, "The National Guard will be here as long
as necessary••• Our job Is to end lawlessness in Cleveland. H24 He also spoke
with Vice-President Hubert Humphrey in an effort to obtain low interest or interest-
free loans for the merchants whose businesses were destroyed in the activities of
the Hough area. Once again, saloons were ordered to close at sundown, and a cur-
few proposal of City Council President James Stanton was considered but no en~
acted. Five rioters, each under twenty-five years old, were sentenced to the Work-
house for their roles In the first evening's festlvities. 25
Darkness fell over che city accompanIed by relat1ve order in the Hough area.
Threw guardsmen were stationed at every intersection on Hough Avenue, and police
patrols were escorted by guardsmen. The new strategy helped to avert any new major
acts of violence, but tne atmosphere was described as ~tense." Small fires and acts
of vandalism kept the police and guard busy. but the main snow of policp and ell~rn
strengtn along Hough Avenue had resulted in increased trouble in the outlying Glen-
ville and Kinsman areas. Fire alarms poured in from the surrounding areas, and all
fire equipment was being utilized at 11 P.M.26 Shortly after midnight~ Pollee Chief
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Wagner announced, "We have secured the Hough area, but the trouble has spread to
the fringQg.ff27
Suddenly, at 4:00 A.~, fire swept through the University Party Center, lOa
cated south of the Hough area, and immediatAly the area was inundated with police,
guardsmen, and firemen who attempted to battle the blazeo Inside a house closeby,
Henry Townes thought it best to evacuate his wife, 16, and their two young children
from the impending danger. They loaded some belongings in Townes' 1957 convertible,
and with their two children and Mrs. Townes' younger brother, they attempted to
drive out of the area to the home of Mrs. Townes· mother. The car pulled out of
the driveway and into the street, which had been barricaded by police to seal off
all traffic, and it was immediately stopped and surrounded by the police. Hot words
were exchanged by Townes and the police, and soon the argument turned to a physical
strussla as the policemen attempteu tu keep Townes from driv1ng any further by pull-
ing him out of the car. On the other side of the car_ a policeman sought to pull
Mrs. Townes away from her husband. to whom she was clinging tightly. The policeman
suceessfully pulled Mrs. Townes away by her hair, and the sudden release by Mrs.
Townes coupled with the struggle between Mr. Townes and the police caused the manu-
ally operated car to lurch forward quite suddenly. Panic stricken, Townes tried
to gain control of the car and leave the area. Police immediately opened fire, and
Townes· car was riddled by bullets. Mr. Townes himself was not hit, but Mrs. Townes
and the youngest child were seriously injured and received permanent disabilities.
nle other two youngsters in the car were injured, but not seriouslyo Twenty-one
bullets in all ripped into the vehicle, none of which were fired by guardsmen, 81-
thought one guardsman was injured by a ricocheting bullet. Ernest Williams, the
twelve-year-old younger brother of Mrs. Townes, reported later, "It sounded like
they were using a machine gun o There were so many shots, so fast. f ,28
All of the injured were taken to University Hospital, and Townes were arrested
and charged with using his automobile as a deadly weapon in an attempt to crash
through a police roadblock. The County Grand Jury later refused to indict him. 29
The event served to once again heighten the tenSion surrounding the entire city.
and the city braced for another outbreak of violence.
Those ~o predicted further trouble were not disappointed. The fears of the
Central Area Community Council became realities early Thursday morning as fires
and vandalism spread to that area southwest of Hough. The SWitchboard of the fire
department wa5 flooded witn alarms, and by late afternoon of the fourth day of
the disturbance, 115 fires were reported, almost half of which were set off by
Molotov cocktails. 30 Once asain, all vehicular traffic was barred from Hough
Avenue, and the area was given the strictest security surveillance since the
riots began. Councilman M. Morris Jackson, a Negro from a predominantly Hough
-l2-
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ward, requested the mayor to place the Hough area under martial law.
Mayor Loch~r r~portp.d that martial lau was not heing considprpd, and that a
curfew had not been instituted Hbecause of the great difficulties of enforcement
and the tremendous hardships it would place on innocent people."32 He and Major
General Hostetler conferred and decided that no additional Guard troops would be
needed because Major Hostetler felt that the available force could handle any new
developments in the situation.
Locher also came under attack from two different sourceso The NAACP blasted
Locher for failing to act on previously made recommendations by the Negro community,
and it demanded the ouster of Safety Director John McCormick. The police depart-
ment waS charged with an "inability ••• to realistically understand the gr1e-
vances and sensitivity of the Negro community." The charges also included demands
f~r the complpt~ ihteBration of the Polioe Department, new hOUSing in Hough within
sixty days, and a meeting of black leaders with the mayor. 33
A group of Negro pastors on the East Side also addressed Some requests to
Mayor Locher. This effort called for more Negro policemen, enforcement of all
housing codes, establishment of additional playgrounds, and the immediate start of
new construction in blighted areas. It also requested the mayor to declare Cleve-
land's East Side a disaster area and sought to have emergency housing and supplies
made available to the people of the damaged area through the health and welfare
agencies. 34
Thur~uay alsu wiLne~sed an increased espousal of the consp1racy theory as ap-
plied to the riots 6 Police Chief Wagner stated that the rioting of the third night
and early Thursday morning "definitely seemed more organized than the last two
nights 6 "35 Council President Stanton concurred with the police chief, claiming
that the rioters were organized because of the selective looting that had occurred.
Many people expressed the belief that the organizers were from outside of the com-
munity, and one priest declared that some cars with out of state licenses should
be impounded. 36
The courts were quite busy with preliminary hearings on many of those arrested
in the course of the disorder. It was disclosed that about one-fourth of those arm
rested up to this time were juveniles, but most of the persons having preliminary
hearings were between cwenty-f1ve and th1rty-tlve. 37 However. the disorder still
smoldered beneath the relative calm that passed over the city as the day ended o
Once darkness had set in, the pattern of arson and vandalism began once again.
In the four hours follOWing sundown, firemen battled some fifty-five fires, most of
them set by arsonists. It was estimated that ninetymone fires were set in the time
between 9:00 PoM. and 3 A.M. on Friday, and the fire department found itself hard
pressed for equipment for the fourth straight night. 38
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In the Kinsman area, a quarter of a mile from the horne of Mayor Locher, a fifty-
four year old Negro, Sam Winchester, was fatally shot as he waited for a bus. Re-
ports stated that Winchester told the police before he died that his a~sassin was
white. The murder, like all the others, however, was not solved, and despite its
distance from the center of the disturbances, it only further hampered interracial
relations. 39
Police were ordered to record out-of-state license numbers of cars in troubled
areas in an effort to pinpoint any "outside agitation," and there were reports that
FBI agents were in the area to uncover any leads on professional troublemakers~
Looting and sniping were considerably down by comparison to the rest of the
week's B~tivities> and as a result, it appeared that the pGriod or disorder was ba--
ginning to draw to a close.
Friday was the quietest day since the riots began. Mayor Locher met for ninety
minutes with Wagner, McCormick, and Hofstetler, and announced that there would be
no further call~up of guardsmen. He also rejected both the imposition of a curfew
and the declaration of martial law, claiming that there were many legal questions
involved (e~g., who could legally declare a state of martial law) and that the con-
sequences of such action were too broad. 40
Police Chief Wagner claimed that the J. F. K. House. 4l run by Lewis G. Robinson.
was serving as a Hfire bumb Lraining school," and pIctures shOWing gaso11ne cans
and empty bottles in the building appeared in the local newspapers. Some public
nfficials claimed to have talkad with students of the "school," as well as other
people who described how the school operated. 42 Police, however, made no arrests,
and no charges were filed against Mr. Robinson. One high-ranking city official ad-
mitted that no youths questioned by police had admitted to receiving any fire bomb
training at the youth center. 43
National guardsmen stopped an automobile at East Slst and Chester early in the
morning and confiscated many "inflammatory leaflets" prepared by the W. E. B~ Du-
Bois Club. The four men in the car with the leaflets were questioned and released,
but the incident added fuel to the conspiracy argument being advocated by many
people in Cleveland. 44
Friday night was almost normal. Only twenty firecalls were turned in all night,
and fewer people were arrested than was normal for a summer Friday night. Every-
thing was relatively quiet in the riot-torn area, and conditions were muc~ im·
proved. For the fifth straight night, however, gunfire interrupted the calm.
Benoris Toney, 29. black father of five, was driving alone when he was hit in
the face by a shotgun blast from another car in the early morning hours at the cor-
ner of 121st Street and Euclid Avenue. The police immediately apprehended six sus~
pects. all white, and Toney was rushed to the hospital.
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The close proximity of the incident and the tension that prevailed stirred
many of the residents of Murray Hill. known to city residents as 'fLlttle Italy,"
and So police and guardsmen spent the rest of the night subduing some crowds that
had gathered in this area. only a short distllncp. from Houeh.45 Al"f>.!lr~l'\t1y Tonli!Y
had been the victim of a self-appointed vigilante group that was attempting to se-
cure the area from the black threat. Only a year and a half earlier, Murray Hill
residents had vehemently protested and rioted against the bussing of Negro students
to schools in the Italian neighborhood, and the strained racial relations had once
again hit the boiling point with the ou~break of the disorder in Hough. The Toney
shooting came after a false rumor circulated through the area that two Italian
reSidents were shot and wounded by Negro marauders. Toney died on Saturday night,
the fourth Negro killed by bullets since the rioting began. and charges of second
degree murder were i~sued against two IIlen amI a juvenile un the follow1ng Monday
morningo46
Q'l Saturda.y, lIn ;mnnllncemen t was made by the mayor that Cleveland was app lyine
for $150,000 of federal funds to help clean ~p the riot area. He also announced
his unwillingness to meet with a group of Negro ministers who had requested to see
him until after order had been restored in the area o An appeaL was again made to
all concerned citizens to help correct the problems that had been raised by the
47riots.
A few isolated cases of sniper fire were reported Saturday night, but other-
wise, a peaceful pall spread over the entire city. Detectives in Shaker Heights,
an upper middle class suburb on the East Side, stopped a car with six black youths
on Lee ROell.! at th~ :ooul.h end of the suburb and discovered an abundance of raw
materials that went into the production of firebombs in the caro However, fires,
vandalism, looting and murder were finally absent from the evening's activities.
The Guardsmen stationed in Murray Hill also proved to be deterrents from any fur-
ther violence in that ethnic subculture. 48 Talk was beginning to circulate that
the National Guard would be released in a few dayst and the entire community ap~
peared ready at last to return to normalcy.
Sunday was normal. There was very little activity of any kind during the daYt
just as on any normal Sunday, and that night saw no outbreaks of any kindo A
rainstorm. late by perhaps six dayst the police and the presence of the National
Guard~ combined with the attitudes of the people in the communitYt all contributed
to making Sunday night abnormally quiet. By IlSOO P.M., the Ure department had
responded to only one call. However, no definite plans were yet announced regard~
ing the release of the Gusrd. 49
On Monday, July 25, exactly one week after the incident occurred in the Seventy·
Niners' Cafe which set off the disorders. the Pick.N.Pay groc~ry store on Hough
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Avenue reopened, and normal life slowly tried to return to Hough and the rest of
Cleveland. A filling station attendant in the Hough neighborhood, however, aptly
expressed the feelings of many others in the area when he said~ "You canOt say ltOs
back to normal because it wonVt be a3 before."SO The damage was totaled. the situ-
ation was surveyed, and the city reflected on the events of the previous week and
plotted its course of action in the months to follow.
The National Guard, first called out on July 19, was gradually released from
active duty during the week of July 25th. The process ended when the last guards-
men were released from duty on July 31 and given thankS from Mayor Locher for the
rest of the community. It was computed that 2215 guardsmen were paid $187,488 for
~e~vlce from three to thirteen days.51
The City Safety Department estimated their share of the cost at $248,1810 This
figure included almost 70,000 hQurs of overtime work for firemen and policemen~, as
well as damage to vehicles of the Fire and tolice departments. 52 But the damage to
the riot-stricken area was impossible to estimate. Some guesses went into several
millions, whereas others hovered between one and two million. However, damage in
riots is not measured only in dollars and cents. Four people had been killed, many
others injured. and intangible damage was beyond computation. Scores of individuals
had been arrested duilng the disturbance-s, and their ages prOVided interesting evi-
~nce as to who were the actual rioters.
Although many people saie that it was mostly teenagers who looted and burned,
oth~rs recalled seeing :scatterings of older men in the corwds. Still others believed
that the teenagers in the area had been incited by outsiders. Mrs. Juanita Stepps, a
n~i8hborhood youth work~rs, admitted, "It would not take much to 3tir up the teen-
agers; they have nothing and need everythlngo"53 Statistics of those arrested and
given hearings tended to support the belief that the majority of the participants
were young. Although juveniles were not listed in the paper, a sampling of those
appearing in court during the week follOWing the disorders showed a concentration
of nineteen-year~oldswho had participated. The median age of those appearing was
twenty~twoi and tne average figure was pulled up to twenty~five by isolated cases
of older men becoming involved in the action (see AppendiX ():le ).54
While observers computed the damagE and analyzed the disorders, the City of
Cleveland, still reeling from the shock of the previous week!s activities, strained
to return to normal. The masS violence and disorder were over. Unfortunately, the
problems were not.
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II. CLEVELANDv S REACTION
In the aftermath, the simplest solution
was to look for villains •••1
In the immediate first days of the calm following the disorders, relief was
promised to the residents of the stricken area G Congressman Michael Feighan said
that financial relief would be provided to riot victims and also indicated that the
disorders would be the subject of a congressional investigation. 2 The Small Business
Autho'l'ity announced that it would lIIC1ke luan::s to Hough area bUSineSsmen wnose stores
had b~en damaged or destroyed and who wantetl to rebuild or relocate. 3 The Legal Aid
Society said that more than thirty experienced criminal lawyers were offering their
legal serviceS free to indigent persons who had been arrested during the disturbances. 4
Even Mayor Locher announced some plans for relief for the area in the near futur~.
He stated that the city planned to advertise for bids on three parcels of land to
be developed for 110 low-cost housing units for the Hough ares. S But the reaction
of the community to the previous week of violence and disorder was nor primarily one
oriented to reconstructing the damaged black community. The problemt it seemed t waS
to find out~ and specifically who had caused the riots.
Many cific leaders denounced the disturbances as just "lawlessnesS." Both Mayor
Locher and City Council President Stanton claimed that the riots had no connection
with the civil rights movement, but were instead just "a matter of lawlessness.,,6
Some Negro leaders agreed with this assessment of the situation. Harry Alexander,
business manager Bnd secretary of the Negro owned and run f!!l ~~, said that the
tiots themselves were not racial, but that they "were triggered ••• because of con-
stand t continued discrimination against Ne8roes.~7 Councilman Leo Jackson of the
neighboring Glenville area strongly agreed with the mayor and city council president.
He classified the disorders as ~a struggle, not for civil rights, but a struggle by
thugs for l~adership of the Negro community."8 He also went on to describe the rioters
as
• an element which looks with contempt on the man who holds
two jobs to support his family; disrupts schools and takes over playgrounds;
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snatches purses of women rather than seeking employment, burglarizes homes
ana stanas around 8tree~ cornera ~reatlng our women with disrespect.)
Jackson further claimed that the action had been organized and precipitated by
Hhoodlums."
Such an attitude was to be heard often In the weeks that followed. Police Chief
Wagner called the efforts "criminal syndicalism.~ and proposed that simplified riot
laws be enacted that would enable the police to charge one person with inciting a
riot to replace the existing law which permitted arrests only if there were at least
three persons conspiring to riot. lO A white councilman, Edward Katallnas, from a
neighboring ward, claimed tnat the riots had been planned purposely for when National
Guard units would have difficulty mobilizing quickly. He added that some disturbances
along Superior Avenue on the northern boundary of the Hough area that had occurred
ear11er in June Were a planned "dry run" for the Hough disorders. However, Kata~
linas also mentioned that there did exist some underlying causes for the trouble,
~nd he pointed specifically to Mayor Ralph Locher 9 s 4dmln!strA~ion as one of them.
Plans were made by the administration, ne said, for a $385,000,000 highway and a
catoh basin in the lake that prohibit~d th~m from doing mor~ for th~ East Sid@ de-
pressed areas. ll Other leaders focused their attention on both the city government
and the frustr~tlon of the black community.
Bertram E. Gardner, the executive director of the Cleveland Community Relations
Board, thought that the rioting indicated "a combination of frustrations," which in~
eluded hous1ng~ jobs and education problems. There wasp in his words, "a deterioTa~
tion of the total community" that stemmed from people who were "unwilling or unable"
to nandle the problems of the city. The war on poverty was not a total failure, but
Gardner claimed that it was by no means the total answer to the problems of the ghet-
too He as~erLed that the real provoca~lon for the riots did not come from any of the
specific problems th.t were often mentioned, but instead it came from tne "deep frus~
t~ationlt that resulted from the oombination of inequiti~s.12
The ineptitude of the city government was also bewailed by Ernest C. Cooper,
executive director of the Urban League of Cleveland. He blamed the cityOs power struc~
ture and the maintenance of the status quo for the disorder. "Authorities appear to
be more interested in controlling the situation than attempting to work out the prob-
lems that cause violence," he stated in a press release. He also challeng@d the city
government ~to give concrete evidence to those persons who find themselves frustra~
ted••• that a positive change is taking place around the pressing problems they
fac@ in everyday life."l3
State Representative Carl Stokes, a Negro who had narrowly missed unseating
Mayer Locher in the election the previous fall, remarked that black leaders had been
unable to offer the community any "evidence of hope and pro8ress~ because of a "long
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list of studies, plans, and broken promises" that had been made by the municipal
government. 14 The charge against the city government was further amplified by Coun-
cilman M. Morris Jackson. He attributed the causes to a lack of communication be-
tween Hough people and the white community and specifically referred to broken prom-
ises on urban renewal projects that the government had made to the people. Jackson
stated that despite its allocated budget of millions of dollars, the urban renewal
program had failed to provide adequate housing or recreation facilities. Insuffi-
cient city services and the lack of an integrated police force were also mentioned
by Jackson as causes of the riots. 15 County JudgeThomas Parrino spoke for many of
the community leaders when he said~ "The seeds of these riotous acts are found in
grave social injustice. Poverty and a denial of equal opportunity produce~ enormous
frustrations••,16
Numerous members of thl" community r",fl@ct""d the sentiments of their l~Ader51.
while others exhibited bitter personal feelings toward other members of the community.
Many of· the neigh~orbood merchants were shocked and dismayed that the businesses
which had taken them a lifetime to build had suddenly been destroyed so quickly and
easily.
Joe Berman. owner of the Starlite Delicatessen for twelve years, had locked the
front door of his store with six~inch spikes the day after the first outbreak of vio-
lence. That night the spokes didn't hold the door past six o'clock, and when Berman
returned the next morning, he found looters running throughout his food store in full
daylight while the police cruised nearby. His reaction was typical. "I've been here
twelve years and never had any serious trouble with anyone. But whether you're good
or hAd mak~~ ho difference when a riot comes. We all got it. H17
The riots ended twenty-one years of work for Ai and Louis Rosenberg, owners of
the Corner Cut~Rate Dru~ Store. and nineteen years of labor for the own~r of 8 meat
market, Earl Gamer. The Rosenbergs, like most other merchants, could not understand
why their business had been a target for destruction but the fact that two black-
owned businesses across the street and next door had been left unscathed helped to ex-
plain the reasons. Garner was somewhlt bitter, and his attitude probably exemplified
the feelings of fellow merchants who had been wiped out. Upon viewing his ruined
business, he announced, "I can't and will not open again. I'm completely ruined."
He went on to add, '~hen I moved in here nineteen years ago, there were very few Neg-
roes~ They came to me, I didn't come to tBem. H As to the charges of low quality food
at high prices, Gamer replied, "They say we are capitalizing on them. well, that'S
not true.,,18
Many of the area's residents. however. did not agree with Gamer's assessment
of the situation. Mrs. Daisy Craggett. a leader in the Hough Community Council.
claimed that the store owners that had suffered had ~de up for their losses in ad-
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vance "over and over again • • • in bad service and high prices for inferior merchan-
diseo,.19 ~hp Rl~o recalled her experience of w~lkin8 through thG violence-torn neigh-
borhood on the third day of the disorders:
I walked through the area. I saw those highQprice stores burning
down. I couldn't feel too badly.20
Many of the local residents echoed the sentiments of Mrs. Craggett. Julius X.
the operator of a Hough beauty salon, showed obvious resentment toward the white man.
"The white man is reaping what he has sown. He 1s learning you can~t push people
around. This trouble is here because the white man won't treat the black man right,"
he commented after the second night of trouble. The same militancy was apparent in
the attitude of JamAS .Jackson. ~ YOllne rpsicl~nt of Hough. who claimed that "about nine-
ty percent of the people out here want to get whitey." A black dry cleaner in Hough
whose business had not been harmed in the riots lamented that the disorders had "been
a long time coming and it's about time; it's too bad some of our own people have to
suffer••••"21
Most of the older residents of the neighborhood were most concerned with this
fact that Some of "their own" people did have to suffer, and as a result, they ques-
tioned both the motives and purposes underlying the urban disorder. Mrs. Ceola King,
a worker in the area anti-poverty office, wondered if the people of Hough had done all
the damasc. "Why would people want to harm themselves1" she asked. "The hardships
that are created are going to be the hardships of the people who live in Hough," she
later observedo 22 Agr~Ampnt with this attitude prevailed only among some of thc older
people. A shoe store manager in the area commented after a few days of rioting, "They
are burning up their homes and their jobs. They are burning up their payday and hurt~
ing our own people.,,23 The director of Halfway House, a transition center in Hough
for released conVicts, Reverend James Redding, said th~t the released convicts
ffshook their heads, bewildered by the foolish destruction." He added;
ThiS is all so useless and senseless. Here we are, trying
to rebuild people into dccent, law-abidins cltlzen~, trying
to give them a better chance •• and they spend a night watch-
ing people trying to destroy themselves.
As an afterthought, Reverend Redding said, "Maybe one of the problems is that no one
has been listening to what we have been saying.,,24 Even among those people who op-
posed the violence because of its self-destructive effects, there remained the gnawing
feeling of frustration.
Everyone in Hough seemed to be angry with everyone else. A newspaper reporter
wrote that along Hough Avenue, people "talked in expressions of shame and defiance,
anger and anxiety. Young men spoke of their grievances against the white man, old
me~ of their grievances against the young.,,25
Reactions varied as to the amount of support that the Violent actions commanded
in the black community. Bertram Gardner felt that perhaps "ninety to ninety-five per.
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cent of the people" did not approve of the methods of destruction, and that the riots
did not have "community approvaL"26 However; many of the t"esidcnts disagreed with
Gardner's appraisal. phil Mason, a field worker in the Hough area, felt that a sub-
stantial portion of the community supported and participated in the action by noting
that "people who were just si tting on their porches would run over to a store after
the windows were broken and steal stuff.,,27
Other community residents and leaders directed their efforts towardootermining
the specific nature of the problems that helped to foment the trouble. The pastor
of Calvary Presbyterian Church, Reverend Bruere, pinpointed aeveral specific causes
of the riots which he had observed in his work of helping his church pioneer projects
tu alleviate some inner-city problems. He blamed the disorder on everyone in the Com-
munity) and cited specifically the churches which had moved out of the inner city as
thQ Negro moved in, the city admlniat:catluu's incompetence, apathetic citizens of
the city. suburbs that wanted f'to reamin aloof from the problems of the city," Hab-
sentee lanalords and irresponsible tgn4ntA," and "people who produce large families
of illegitimate children ••• people who loaf and expect to be supported by some
welfare agency.fl2S No one was spared in Bruere's sweeping indictment of the entire
community, but most other people; such as Guy Goens, a supervisor at the Hough anti-
poverty oftice, were less broad in their diagnoses of the problem. He emphasized that
one of the principle causes of the disorder was "the general frustration in Hough."Z9
Many organizations across the city joined in the search for underlying causes
for the riots, but most of their findings seemed to echo those sentiments expressed
by indiVidual citizens. The East Side Community Union, a group of seventy-five Glen-
vill~ r~~luents once again expressed the dominant view of the Negro community. Its
report stated:
ThQQQ go-oalled disturbances ~re not isolateu uprislng~ of teen=age
vandals, nor are they the result of 'outside agitators.' They are
the expression of a despait t of an anger that is deeply ingrained
ipto the Negro community; a despair and anger caused by years of
exploitation, suppression and discrimination. 30
The Congress on Racial Equality chapter charged all responsible businessmen and
administrators of the city with the failure to address themselves to the problems
faced by the ghetto; substandard hOUSing, poor educatiDn, large unemployment, and
minimum welra~~ p~ogramso31 The city leaders were also singled out by the Council
of Churches of Christ as a major factor behind the disorders. It claimed that the
le~der~hipfs inability to understand "the depth of discontent and desp~ra~lon felt
by large numbers of Cleveland Negroes ft had caused the riots and made them so danger-
ous. 32 The Americans for Democratic Action ~1I88egted that thQ cd ty could raise the
level of welfare to a decent standard and thus break the two bonds of misery,. pover-
ty and segregation, that united the Hough ghetto.))
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Analyses of the trouble continued to emanate from many individuals in the
s.triokcn o.rca. At an area meeting near the Huugh area helu ou SUlHlay, July 25,
speakers said that the troubles there had been bad, but that they were what the city
deserved. These opinions flowed from a broad spectrum of opinion -~ from ministers
to Black Nationalists ano from middle-aged people to the more militant youth. 34 The
black youth and teens were almost unanimous in their feelings of hatred and distrust
for the whites. Examples of their reactions follow:
You (whitey) reap what you have sown ••••
we showed we a1n't scared of them ••••
We'Ve done the city a favor. Look at the urban renewal we've
acoomplished •••• 35
Whitey, however, also reacted to the black community in less than congenial
terms. Firemen talked of quitting because they were not paid to "fight a guerrilla
war" w1th the black man. Fire Chief William tiarry stated the opinions of many of
his men when he said, almost incredulously, "¥le came out to prote~t lives and these
p~ople attacked us. 1t A stnff member of the University-Euclid Urban Renewal rroject
illustrated a large segment of sentiment in the white community as well as an unen-
lightened view of the underlying caUSes of the disorders when he said, «Police should
be ordered to shoot all looters ••••tt36
Still confUSed and bewildered by the events that shattered the calm summer.
Clevelanders groped to find answers to the questions raised by the riots. The mixed
emotions toward violence accompanied by a general feeling of frustration and a deeply
ingrained resentment of whites which characterized the black community only demonstra·
ted the need for lasting solutions to the city's problems. The black attitudes ~ere
not widely shared throughout the rest of the community by either the majority of
whites or the city's leadership. If anything, the disorders served in the short
rUlJ Lu fu~t.her polarhe the C1 ty' S "establ1shment" and the black communi ty -- two
groups which, in the previous few years, had been drifting farther apart. The dif-
f~r~nces and problems had become more apparcn~ as well 6S more intractable.
It appeared doubtful that a non-partisan investigation of the disorders by a
group of "respected" citi2:ens, such as the Grand Jury, would resolve any differences
or settle any quarrels. Such an investigation might only further alienate the black
community without resulting in any positive good. Thus, as the hot summer began to
cool down, the city stood frustrated i~ its efforts to understand itself.
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III. TIlE GRAND JURY VS. THE BlACK COMMUNITY
Will this crisis bri~g forth conven-
ventional wisdom that seeks out scape-
goats and attempts to show that Cleve-
land was victim of a sinister master
plan?l
In an effort to uncover the real underlying causes of the Hough disorders,
Judge Thomas Parrino announced on July 2s that R sppciAl se~sinn of thp Cuyahoga
County Grand Jury had been called for the next day. The Grand Jury's task would be
to ferret out the real sources of unrest and trouble. Specifically, the purposes of
the investigation included assistance in the restoration of order, suggestions of
"meaningful remedies to existing community problems," and taking "appropriate
action where evidence of unlawful acts" was discovered. 2
The jury convened the next day to begin its study of the disorders. Its first
act of business was to take a fifty minute bus ride through the riot-torn area of
Hough to provide background information of the physical realities and problems of
the area. The trip waS made for ~L1ucatluuCll pu.r:P~l\i~S uuly, bel,;ause none of the Grand
Jury members resided in the Hough area. However, at the end of the trip some indi-
cation of the investigations's future course was given by the jury's foreman t Louis
Seltzer, the former editor of the Cleveland Press. Sel~er, r~garded by many
people as a very powerful man and as a firmly entrenched member of the Cleveland
"establishment," had become a controversial personality in the city because of his
newspaper's account of a Cleveland murder and its subsequent trial twelve years
earlier. 3 He was soon to become even further embroiled in controversy of a differ-
ent nature, for he remarked at the conclusion of the fifty minute bus tour that:
The Grand ~ury saw enough to realize
the violence was organized and planned
because of specific targets singled
out for loOting and burn1ng. 4
His conclusions passed largely unnoticed the next day in the newspaper, but other
sources also revealed that Seltzer was being sued for libel by Lewis G.. Robinson at
~he time of the investigation. Robinson was suing Seltzer personally for the Press's
account of the announcement that Robinson was forming a gun club in the Hough area a
year earlier. 5 Some persons called for Seltzer to disqualify himself as a prospective
juror because Robinson had been mentioned during the disturbance as a possible instiga~
tor of the trouble, and his J. F. K. House had been identified as a training ground for
fireubombing. In addition, Robinson was scheduled to testify before the jury as a subu
poenaed witness. However, Seltzer remained as toreman of the jury, and, despite a
rather rocky beginning, the investigation into the riots proceeded with the testimony
of subpoenaed witneSSes for the next severa! days •
..26·
Civic leaders t government officia1s t residents of Hough, law enforcement men t
and community leaders all testified before the jury. The proceedings were marked by
surprise witnesses and by surprise performances by the witnesses who testified. On
the second day of the hearings t a seventeen year old resident of Hough was reported
to have given the jury the names of "leaders and plotters" of the disturbances, along
with dates when meetings had been held to discuss violence. He ostensibly testified
that the Black panthers t a gang of more than two hundred youths in the Hough area.
had caused more damage and terror than any other gang during the riots. Later the
same daYt Lewis G. Robinson appeared to testify before the jury wearing a button that
read, "The Viet Cong never called me NIGGER." He denied that his JFK House was in-
volved in the manufacturing of fire bombs or instruction in their use. 6 His tQsti-
mony was followed by the appearance of the Reverend Charles Rawlings, executive
director of the commission on metropolitan affairs of the Greater Cleveland Council
of Churches, lnd the hearings returned to a more sedate pace. The Grand Jury ap-
plauded two witnesses, M. Morris Jackson and Ralph FindleYt head of the Greater Cleve-
land Council of Economic Opportunities, at the end of their testimonies. Neither man
attacked the city administration as a primary cause of the riots.]
Four young members of the W. E. B.Du Bois Club testified before the jury in the
following day's seSSion. It was reported that two of the members resorted to the
Fifth Amendment, and therefore, refused to answer any questluns. After testifying,
one member of the group read a prepared statement outside the room in which the hear-
ings were being held thRt Accused the Mayor, the Sa£Qty Director, and Police Chief
of being "criminally responsible" for the conditions and violence In Hough. Upon
finishing, an unidentified Negro woman approached him, and immediately began berating
the individual for the trouble that he and his friends had supposedly helped to foment.
She yelled adamantly, "I want you to know we didn't ask for you in the Hough area. We
don't need you in the Hough area. We don't want you Un the Hough area. You and your
group do nothing but arouse people."S The woman then scurried off qUickly, before
shocked reporters could establish who she waS or why she had cried out so vehemently.
Police reports had indicated that some members of the Du Bois Club had come to Cleve-
land about two weeks Le!ure Lite violence, and ~ha~ ~hey had settled near the center
of the riot-torn area. It was still unclear as to the role, if any, that they had
played in thp di~ord~rs. The hearings moved on, and testimony was heard in the next
few days from public servants who were involved in various activities relating to the
disturbances.
On August 2. the last day of the hearings, the jury heard testimony from two
witnesses who were believed to be police undercover agents. 9 The two witnesses were
shielded from contact with the press or photographers t and after the testimonYt the
formal hearings ended. The jury then went into closed session to draw up the document
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that hopefully would providp. thp anRwprR to many qupstions that hAd hppn raisprl hy
the trouble in Hough. The commanity anxiously awaited the report of the Grand Jury,
and So the group was under some pressure to produce its conclusions as qUickly as
possible"
!be Grand'Jury's answers were presented to the community in the form of a report
that was issued on August 9 by its foreman, Louis Seltzer. The statement was divided
into three parts~ a preface outlining some general observation of the members of the
jury; one section tnat sought to Hestablish the immediate cause of the fire bombing
shooting (!!£), pillaging, general lawlessness and disorder"; and a section that de-
scrIbed some of the basIc cond1t1ons under whIch the resIdent:; of HOUlSh l1vli:u. lO A
brief recapitulation of the jury's findings is necessary to understand the broader
implication$ of the report.
The preface of the dooument dealt largely with the general attitudes of the mem-
bers of the jury. They stated their firm belief that America needed a Hrenewal of
good citizenship" by everyone and went on to deplore the apparent decay and erosion
"of ideals and principles of God and Country and their persistent replacement by the
deification of material idols and material 'principals.'" They stated their con-
viction that law and order were the prerequisites of civilized society and that there
"should be a restoration of the qualities of good faith, of honesty, and a wi llingness
to hear out the other person or side without resort to violence and disorder••••"
The preface ended by calling for "not so much a blood bath but a good cleansing
spiritual bath."ll
The first section was centered around the concl~sion that. in the words of the
jury itSelf:
• the outbreak of disorder was both organized, precipitated,
and exploited by a relatively small group of trained and disci~
plined professionals at this business. 12
Th!:l "agitAtors" were avowl:!d belil:!vers in violence and extremism, the report sAid,and
they had some affiliation with the Communist party. The section also concluded that
the majority of the residents of Hough had neither participated in nor benefited from
the outbreaks of disorder, and it lamented the fact that the laws of both Cuyahoga
County and the State of Ohio prohibited them from indicting any "'responsible irre~
sponsibles'" for their parts in the disorders. Both the Police Department and the
National Guard were commended for their effective work in the "aggravated situation."
The jury expressed its beliefs that the potential still existed for "repetition of
these disorders" and that the results of anY' new action would be "equally disastrous."
Then, before referring to specific individuals and organizations that the jury felt
were major contributors to the disorder, the report warned of the Communist threat
and its d~nsers, suah as "the effective uses madQ of impressionable, emotionally im-
mature and susceptible young minds by those who for one reason or another have set
out to accomplish their designs and objectives in Europe, Asia. South America and
elsewhere. "
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The Grand Jury report then went into specifics and named individuals who were
responsible for the disorder without issuing any indictments. It claimed that the
young people who were engaged in the acts of lawlessness had obviously been "assigned,
trained and disciplined" in their specified roles because of the selective pattern of
destruction and the fact that "the targets were plainly agreed upon." It also suggested
that both the Superior Avenue disturbances in late June and the Hough area disorders
were planned and fomented by the same individuals. l4
The Jw F. K. HouGe (called only by th~ name Jomo Freedom Kenyat:t:a) and its lead-
ers received the brunt of the Grand Jurygs accusations. Lewis G. Robinson and his
wife~ and three other associat~s of Robinson who were also advocstcs of black nation-
alism were named as responsible for aiding and abetting the disorders. The jury claimM
~d to have been shown "irrefutable evidence" that Robinson had "pledged reciprocal sup-
port to and with the Communist rarty of Ohio." The four members of the Do Bois Club
who testified before the jury were also charged with responsibility for the riots, al-
though the only points that were made against them were that they had arrived in town
two w~eks before the trouble, lived near the center at the ghetto 9 "were seen constant-
ly t.ogetheI'," and had contacted the Communist party. IS
The report shifted gears again by commending the police and firemen for their ef-
forts to maintain law and order in the face of great personal danger and their general
conduct during the trouble. At this point in the report, the jury suggested a number
of changes in the law to strengthen the severity of the law for acts inciting to riot
at actions that occurred in the courSe of a riot (e.g., attempted arson during a riot).
These suggested legal changes ended pArt nnp of the report.
The second and last section dealt speCifically with the "conditions of life pre·
vat ling in the Hough area," and the jury discovered many inequities and adverse condiM
tions which characterized the ghetto. The prevalent sentiment of the black community
was enunciated once again, but with an additional interpretation j when the report
seated, "Poverty and frustration, crowded by organized agitators, served as the uneasy
backdrop for the Cleveland riots." The basic conditions they found included inadequate
and suo-standard hOUSing, exorbitant rents charged by absentee landlords, and non·
enforcement of the housing code. They also discovered "woefully inadequate recrea·
tional £acilitie3,H~ub-5tandardeducational fac1IitieS," and excessive food prices
for inferior quality foodstuffs. The denial of equal economic opportunities, the pro-
gram of Aid to D~pendent Children, and the density of the population were al~u cited
as conditions which led to the feelings of frustration so often expressed in the black
ghetto. Another cause cited in the report was that the black community was attempting
to gain "too much too fast for the community to bear within an arbitrarily fixed time
lim! t.." From this set of conditions, the jury was able to conclude that
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••• all these complex social evils are used as subtle and inflamatory
provocations by resident and non-resident organizers who exploit riots ••
16• •
To meet the pressing problems that were now faced by the city, the jury pro-
posed that all of the cityfs resources should be directed toward solutions, and spe-
cifically recommended four short-range measures that it felt would improve the condi~
tions. These proposals included improved enforcement of the housing code, strengthened
law enforcement in the ghetto, better rubbish collection in the ghetto, and a refurbish-
ed prQgram of urbCill r~Ul~w~l that would have the full cooperation of the Federal Govern-
ment. The report further stated that neither the community nor the leaders of Hough
and other arpas of the community had adequately measured up to their re3ponsibilitie3
and cr.lled upon the poll tical, economic, and civic leaders of the city to ttput Cleve.
land jn the forefront in meeting the sociological and moral challenges of our time."
After paying tri bute to the "wise leaders" who had foreseen the 51 tuation and worked
.tselflessly·t to improve it, the report closed with the declaration that the "time for
total communi ty action is now. ,,17
The Grand Jury had spoken. Reaction to the report was somewhat varied. according to
skin color, but most of the community still did not seem satisfied that the report was an
accurate assessment of the trouble that had occurred. Most controversy centered
aroun3 the jury~s allegations that the rioting was organized and precipitated by
agitators with Communist Party affiliations. Many people felt that the report had
simplified the entire situation, and had not given enough consideration to the very
fundamental causeS which had caused the dlsorder a Preoccupation of the jury with the
highly que:itionabl~ InJlll~dlaLe cau:oe::o of the disorders left: many people feeling that
the jury had not adequately fulfilled its duty to the city.
City officials w~r~ nn~. howpver. among the detractors of the report. Almost
all of the top echelon of the city's government were overflowing in their Fraise of
the document and the great civic effort that had been performed by the jurY~5 members.
Mayor Locher quickly reacted to the report by lauding it as "a notable public service."
Locher said that he agreed fully with the juryUs findings, and added, "This Grand Jury
had the guts to fix the approximate cause - which had been hinted at for a long time
that ~ubversive and Communist elements in our community were behind the rioting."l8
City Council President Stanton and Safety Director John McCormick fully agreed with
the mayor, as did Police Chief Richard Wagner, who had previously pointed out that
the o~ganizers and a~ltators had "studied the laws very carefully and then just as
carefully evaded the scope of their coverage a " Wagner also boasted, ''If the Supreme
Court hadnOt ti~d our hands by preemptins the criminal syndicalism l~ws lor federal
jurisdiction, we would have put those responsible away long ago.,.19 Later in the month,
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~myor Locher fully defended and agreed with the Grand Jury in his testimony before
a Senate Subcommittee on urban problems. There he stated that he assumed that the
Jury had reached "reasonable conclusions~H and added that the turmoil in Cleveland
would not have occurred without Communist 1nstigatlon.20
However, the rest of the community waS not quite so ready to accept the conclu~
sions of th~ report. An editorial in the Cleveland ~, whose former editor ned
served as the foreman of the jury, summed up many feelings when it stated that it
was "hard to believe that so few people wreaked so much havoc." The editorial
closed on a rather pessimistic note, as it claimed:
Furthermore, it might be dangerous to believe. Because once the
community assigns tne Hough looting, snootlng, burning and general
hell~raising to a traveling band from Havana or Peking, the door
will be open for another riot. 2l
Carl Stokes labeled the report a Hwhitewash,. and Bertram Gardner called the ef~
fort an attempt by the white community to escape responsibility for the conditions
which caused the riots. Stokes charged that the jury had exercised a great deal
of "diligence in removing the liability of the city administration as the immed-
di.ate precipitating cause of the riot." They nad performed~ he said, "in the l!!;nmd
old Cleveland style of sweeping the city's mistakes under the rug."22
Federal officials did not agree that subversives and Communists had organized
the rioting, In Cleveland, Uo S. Attorney Merle M. McCurdy declared that Communists
and other agitators had not instigated the disorder. His conclusions, he said, were
based on an "intensive investigation" by the FBI, and personal observations that he
had madeo 23 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach also disagreed with the conclu-
sions of the Grand Jury. He concurred that the riots were indeed fomented by agi~
tators ~~ "agitators named disease and despair, joblessness and hopelessness, rat~
infested housing ana long impacted cynicism •• If but said that the sources of agita-
tiol'Jl were not products of "Communists, Black nationalists, or terrorists." They were
instead the products ot "generac10ns of indifference by all the American people to
the rot and rust and mold which we have allowed to reach into the core of o~ cities. H24
Katzenbach asscrtad that subversive elements did not plan or control the riots in
Cleveland, but had apparently attempted to "exploit" some of the unrest. He stated
that there was no Communist Party invol vement but added that some of the people iden-
tified with the Jo F. K. House had "made some efforts to keep the rioting going."
Apparent~y, reports from both the FBI and the Community Relations Service, both arms
of the Justice Department, had enabled the Attorney General to reach his conclusions. 25
On August 11, two days after the report had been made public, it was also revealed
that the majority of the evidence that the jury had used to conclude that the riots
had been organized by agitators came from two undercover police detectives who had
inf1ltrated many of the organizations of the area. The two men, one white and one
bl~ck, hAd infiltrated tne Du Boi3 Club, tne Jo F. K. House, end the Communi~t
Party as a team, and both men had risen to positions of power in the various or-
ganizations. Jessie Thomas, the black undercover detectiv~. had been el~cted Chair-
man of the local Du Bois Club in January of 1966, and he claimed that financing for
recruiting new members Came from the Communist Party of New York. He stated that he
had heard the individuals who had been irnp1icatedin the Grand Jury report make
speeches at the Jo Fo Ko House that incited youths with such statements as "you've
got to take what you want." and also claimed to have heard talks at the Ja Fa Ko
House about organizing rifle clubs, making fire bombs, and distributing militant
11Lerature. The other undercover agent, Fred ~1ard1n1, a white, had been made the
"Peace Chairman" of the Du Bois Club in late 1965. He was also a member of the Com~
munist Party. However, when asked if he had any personal knowledge of Du Bois Club
members actually planning or leading the Hough disorders, Giardini's reply was, "To
26my personal knowledge, no."
rhus, the controversy over whether or not the violence had been organized and pre~
cipitated by fla small band of agitators" raged on. In Hough, the sentiment was nearly
unanimous that the riots had occurred rather spontaneously, and that no organization
was needed. one reporter observed, "In the streets of Hough, where the only constants
are poverty and the Sidewalks, they are sure of one thing ~- no outside groups ini-
tiated the rioting. tr27
The option was open for the black community to stage a hearing of its own, pattern-
ed similarly to the Grand Jury hearings, to present their own conclusions about tne
disorders. Therefore, 8 citizens' review panel was con~tituted~ and hearings on tue
Hough disturbances were scheduled to begin on Tuesday, August 22. The board was a
biracial one. composed of nine leaders of various ciVic organization~. guch as the
Hough Community Council and the National Association of Social Workers, all ~ whom
had worked and had contact in the Hough area. By means of the mass media. a public
invitation was issued to all individuals who wished to testify, and special invita-
tions were extended t~ Mayor Locher, Council Fresident Stanton, Safety Director John
McCormick, and Assistant safety Director Richard McKean.
The hearings lasted for three days, and twenty-six witnesses (none of them recipi-
ents of special invitations) volunteered to testify. Questioning of the witnesses
was conducted by five lawyers of the community as well as by members of the panel.
From the evidence and testimony presented at the sessions, the panel compiled a full
report of its findings and conclusions and presented the information to the entire
community.
The report was basically structured as a reply to the findings of the Grand Jury.
Its nature was indicated on the first page of the document, where it was clearly
stated that the purpose of presenting the report to the community was tIthe belief
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that the Grand Jury Report fails to substantially give adequate emphasis to the un-
derlying causes of the riot. ff The report went on to say that the emphasis of the
Grand Jury on subversives and outside agitators was a disservice to the community
and that news media during the disturbances did not give adequate Coverage to acts
of injustice and police brutality. Many of the witnesses who volunteered to testify
before the panel had not been called upon to testify before the Grand JurYt 4nd so
the Citizens· Panel Report concludes that "had these residents been invi ted to make
statements to the Grand Jury, the report would have been of a different nature."28
The report was presented in four distinct parts. The first part discussed the
implications of the Grand Jury Report, the second section dealt with the underlying
causes of the riots, the third traced the events of both the Hough disturbances and
the Superior Avenue trouble in June, and the fourth part listed a set of recommenda~
tions which the panel felt to be necessary and desirable for the entire community.
The first section of the report proceeded on the assumption that if the community
w~re Hto allow the Grand Jury report Co go unquestioned and unchallenged (WoUld be)
to give tacit approval to injustice." As a result, the Citizens· Report lashed out
at the various points made by the Crand Jury. It c40tigatcd the Jury for violatin~
the Ohio Code which specifically stated that "the names of people suspected of sub-
versive activity cannot be made public unless there is sufficient evidence for indict-
ment," and the report expressed amazement that the Grand Jury thought the black commu-
nity was moving too fast, implying that "Cleveland has repudiated the carefully docu-
mented report of the United States Civil Rights Commission and rejects the underlying
spirit of the Great Society programs of President Johnson." The report then ques-
tioned the Grand Jury's assessment of the Aid to Dependent Children program by ex-
plaining that an incremental seventy-three cents a day was hardly the motivation for
brlrll;Sing a child into t;he world, as che Grand Jury had implied. The conclusion of
the Grand Jury that outSide agitators caused the riots could only have been founded
upon ignorance of the civil rights movement and the black community of Cleveland, the
report went on to saYt because any individual living in the squalor and poverty of
Hough needed "no one to tell him just how deplorable his living conditions" wereA Af-
ter charging that the Jury.s report did not give adequate prominence to the social
conditions that were the main causative factors of the riots, the section ended with
a condemnation of the Jury for praising every member of the police department when
evidence indicated that there were often instances of poor handling of incidents by
the police. 29
The next portion of the document was concerned with "the social conditions that
exist 1n the ghetto areas of Cleveland," -- the underlying causes of the rioting.
Specifically cited by the panel as these causes were the housing problem and inept
program of urban renewal, poor police relAtions, the high unenploym""nt rate in the
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ghettos. subsistence welfar~ levels and high prices for inferior merchandise. lack
of recreational facilities, and failure by the city government administration to act
on or even acknowledge suggestions made by the Hough leadership to improve that area
of the city. This frustration of the black community was the reason, the report
said, why the majority of the people in Hough ~stood by and let the small minority
try violence and property destruction as a new method (to gain black objectives)."
Thus, while only a small portion of the community had actually engaged in the violence
and destruction, "the sentiments of many ~ere ~ith the rioters."30
The actual events of both the Hough and Superior disturbances were then discussed
in the report. The backt?,rouml Qr tht::: di.:$u"tu'et"s 'fle~ brlel:ly ~""eLched as a settlng for
the trouble which occurred, but the report focused more on instances of abusive prac-
tices of police which were either missed or omitt~d in tn~ reporting by the loeal n9W~
media. The last portion of the section refuted the Grand Jury's conclusion that the
J. F, K. House leadership had helped to organize and plan tne violence. The panel em-
phasized that even though individual members of the House had participated in the
disturbances, "all evidence leads to the conclusion that their behavior was a rejec-
tion of the thinking and problem-solving philosophy expressed by the J. F. K. leader-
ship_,,3l
Ten recommendations were made in the final section, all of which were based on
the evidence presented in the three-day hearings. The recommendations centered pri-
marily around measures to alter police procedure~ and escablish u~~~er police-commu~
nity relationships. The panel proposed an investigation of the "waiver" method of re-
lease from police custody, investigations by the Justice Department of both the prac-
tice of detaining persons without charging them with an offense and the relationship
between the police and the citizens of Cleveland, and the development of a new mech-
anism to adequately respond to grievances of local citizens against specific police
actions. 3' Other recommendations called for increased welfare levels, fair housing
legislation for the city and SUburbs, improved administration of the urban ren~wal
program, and investigation of the shootings that had occurred during the disturbances.
The report advocated that the Grand Jury Report be legally "quashed" because it vio-
lated the Ohio Code, and finally, recognizing the deeply ingrained feeling of impo=
tence and frustration prevalent in the black communi~y, the panel called on ~he mayor
to establish the means by which to maintain continueo contact with the black community
and its leaders. The stated reason for the last proposal was that "if these grie-
vances (of the black community) cannot be given expression through normal channelS,
they wi 11 be expressed destruct! vely. ,,33
The black community had ~e$ponded to the Grand Jury Report. Clearly, there were
great differences in the two interpretations of the riots, and the implications of
the disorders varied on the basis of skin ~olcr. folarization of the two races of
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the community had been nelghtened and certainly not lessened by the differences in
the two reports. Furthermore~ prospects for the near future appeared grim for the
black ghetto, for power was not in their hands, but. instead in the hands of leader-
ship that fully agreed with a repo~t that had been declared inadequate and mistaken
by the black community. Fortunately, however, the long hot Summer was rapidly draw-
ing to a close in Cleveland. As the summer gradually disappeared, the problems ap-
peared to expand while the prospects for solving them seemed to decrease.
Unfortunately, problems of a lifetime and longer are not solved between Septem-
ber and Juneo Very few people expected tnem to be solved that quickly, and for that
reason, the summer ended on twin notes of relief and pessimism •• relief that the Vio-
lence was over, at least for the next nine months, and pessimism that it would return
again next summer in more violent form and with more destructive effects o But Commu-
nities don't live In terms of long range goals or attitudes; they rather plod along
from day to day, worrying only about tomorrow, and not about yesterday or next month.
Next summer was a long ~ime away for Cleveland, and So were solutions to Cleveland's
deep-rooted problems.
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IV. 'mE FRUSTRATI~ OF A BLACK GHETTO
Our nation iii moving toward two
societies, one black, one white
separate and unequal. l
The two divergent reports that were presented in the weeks following the Hough
disturbances carefully attempted to pinpoint the specific causes of the riots. How-
ever, the main emphases of the two interpretations were directly in conflict with
each other -- the Grand Jury Report tried to demonstrate that outside agitators and
COlllllIuuisL ~ympathlz;ers had been tit plrl"clpltat1ng factors involved, and the Citizens'
fanel Report waS primarily motivated to refute the conclusions of the Grand Jury.
The story wa~ not as simple as either report told it. Instead, the diaordera were
caused by a complex and interwoven pattern of events and conditions that produced a
general malaise as well as growing frustration within the ghetto. The conditions of
Hough and the inciting series of events in Cleveland were closely tied together by
the thread of racism _M a thread that ultimately led to five days of destruction and
violence in July, 1966.
Cleveland, Ohio -- A Typical Urban Center
The problems.of Cleveland were similar to those of other .large metrop-oUtan
areaS across the country. An old city that grew in the flush of the industrial revo-
lution, it aged rapidly in the mid-twentieth century, challenged by the suburban push
on its periphery. Like other cities experiencing suburbanization, Cleveland saw the
gradual migration of her industry, her more affluent white taxpayers, and her cher-
ished institutions from the central part of the city to the surrounding communities.
During its fast growth during the booming industrial era, Cleveland developed an
interesting mosaic-like pattern of ethnic residential areas. pockets of ethnic groops
were scattered throughout the ~ity, dnd 11n~~ W~~~ fairly well drawn between settle~
menta of different nationality groups. Most of the wealthier, older families of the
city moved out to th~ s!-1burbs. which surrounded the city ~nd covered a much higner
proportion of the land in the metropolitan area than did the central city. The sub-
urbs had many advantages when compared to Cleveland's inner city.
Therefore, Cleveland found a declining tax base with which to meet new and increasing
problems. The largest set of problems that faced the city focused on the high concen-
tration of poor black people in the inner city.
Statistics from the censuses of 1960 and 1965 illustrated numerically the prob M
lems of the city. The total population of the city decreased from 876,050 in 1960 to
810,858 in 1965, a decline of 7.4~, while at the same time the black population of
the area increased IO.lh from 250,889 to 276,376. . Apparently the whLte population;
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was moving to the suburbs as the black population, because of a very high birth rate
and migration from other parts of the country, was growing within the city.
But the black population, similar to other ethnic groups in the city, was clus-
tered and concentrated in a small section of the community. Almost all of the city's
black people lived in neighborhoods on Cleveland's East Side. Before World War 1,
musl of the Negroes had lived in the Central neighborhood, an area southeast of Hough.
The end of the war was followed by a great influx of Negroes who also settled on the
East Side and moved the arca of concentration to about East 55th Street, the western
borrler of Hough. In the late twenties and early thirties the area continued to move
east. but the period following World War II witnessed the greatest change" Neighbor-
hoods such as Hough, Glenville, Mt. Pleasant, and Kinsman became predominantly black
in their racial composition. There were almost no Negroes living on the West Side, and
nearly half of the few living there resided in public housing.
The segregated pattern of nousing was still abnormally high in the 1960as.
Over ninety-one percent of the city's Negroes would have had to mOVe to different
blocks to have attained a normal racial balance (same per~entage as entire city) in
every block. 2 in the early 1960's, black people began to migrate to a few of the ea.t-
ern suburbs, but their movement out of the city was still very restricted. The limited
black 3uburbanization did not help to alleviate the pre~~ure of the increasing black
population within the city. It waS estimated that about twe-thirds of the increase in
tne black population occurred in areas of the central city which were either biracial
or predominantly black. 3 The curious mosaic pattern had resulted in concentrated
pockets of impoverished black people. The worst such pocket was known as Hough.
Hough -- The Tragic Components of a Ghetto
Causes of unrest and deSpair among
urban-ghetto Negroes, as well as their
grim, sobering and costly consequences
are found in claSSic form in Cleveland. 4
There was an area of two square miles that stretched from East 55th Street to
University Circle on Cleveland's East Side. It was known by the name of the avenue
that bisected the neighborhood - Hough. Hough was a black ghetto.
A ghetto is not merely an area of a city. For its inhabitants it is a way of
life, a means by which to exist. The people of the ghetto are locked in its way of
life and escape is not easy, for the vicious cycle of life that pervades the entire
fabric of the ghetto is almost impossible to break. It is a vicious cycle that in-
cludes segregated and in~e.quate housing, unemployment and a dependence on welfare
to subsist. poor schools that rarely lead to higher learning. an incr~~sing crimp.
rate, disease and squalor which infest everything and everyone, and attitudes of bit-
terness, frustration, and defeat. To the visitor, the most noticeable feature of
the urban ghetto is its phYSical ugliness -- the dirt, the filth, and the total neg~
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leet of the area. As Kenneth Clark stated in his booK Dark Ghetto, "The only constant
characteristic is a sense of inadequacy."S Another characteristic of the ghetto is
that its inhabitants are predominantly black. This fact only increases the barriers
faced by the reSidents of the ghetto. The combined walls of poverty and discrimina.
tion are difficult to scale slmultancously.
The ghetto has not beon a happy place. Little chance ha~ existed for its inhabi-
tants to fulfill the American dream of social and economic upward mobility. Often ex-
ploited by profiteers and politi~iRn~. th~ llrhRn ehpttn~ have stood severed from the
outer world by invisible walls of racism and poverty. Many embittered Americans who
are black have lived within these walls.
Hough was a black ghetto in 1966. Figures from the special Census taken in Cleve-
land in 1965 illustrate the problems of the ares. In 1960, the population of Hough
waS 73.7% black. By 1965, the figure had increased considerably to 87.9% because of
the constant stream of whIte migration to outlying areas. Although the white popula-
tion of the ghetto in 1965 was only one-third of its level in 1960, the number of black
people had only declined a few percentage points. Every census tract in the neighbor-
hood had become predominantly black in the five years between censuses, and everywhere
the percentage of black people in 1965 was higher than in 1960~ The percentage of un-
employed members of the labor for~f' IotBS mll~h hieheT' in Hough than it was for the rest
of the city. For males in Hough, the unemployment rate was 13.4% compared to 6.47. for
the entire city, and the unemployment figure for females there was almost more than
twice the rate for the city. The median number of years of schooling for adults OVer
twenty-five again compared unfavorably, Hougn showing a median of 9.7 years completed
compared to the entire city's 10.3 years, and the difference had been increasing over
the years. The comparison worsened if the quality of the education became another
variable. Most revealing were the income statistics. While the entire cityis median
family real income was increasing from $6,325 in 1960 to $6~895 in 1965~ an increase
of 9.1~, the real income in Hougn per family decreased from $4,900 to $4.050. a de-
creaSe of 17.3% in the same length of time. Hough also experienced an increase of al-
most two thousQnd persons who 6~d$ted below the poverty level in dtis five year period,
despite the fact that the area had lost population in this time. The percentage of
family members subsisting below the poverty line had increased by almost a third in
Hough, while for t~ entire city, the percentage had r.mained rather constant at a rate
one-half to one-third that of Hough. 6
Hough was also crowded. There were about forty-five persons per acre there compared
to a range of ten to thirty-five persons per acre in other city neighborhoods. This
crowding was a result of the World War II years, when Cleveland had become an arsenal
of tne war and thousands of skilled and unskilled workers had migrated to tne city.7
However, unlike the immigrant and ethnic groups who passed through the ghetto stage on
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their way to social acceptance and suburbia, the Southern black people who migrated to
Hough were offered almost no hope of escape. Here they were denied a chance to improve
their lot because of their color or Some other related factors. 8
The area did not become a monolithic slum. Neat houses in rows on one street
contrasted sharply with the places unfit for human habitation. Hough had formerly
been the home of a large segment of the Jewish middle class as well as SOme of the
wealthier families of Cleveland. However, the visible remnants of elegance and better
days only served to intensIty the aura of decay that encompassed Hough. In spite of
the fact that most whites had moved out of the area, many of the small shops, mar~et5
and bars were owned and operated by whites. Many of the rented homes were owned by
absentee landlords, and the condition of most of the land and bUildings was described
by almost everyone as "deteriorating." Although Hough contained only 7.3~ of the
city's population, the area provided nineteen per cent of the welfare cases for the
entire county.9 More than one~tnird of the areafs 1.372 births in 1966 were illegiti-
mate, one~half of them born to teen-age mothers. The infant mortality rate in Hough
doubled that of the rest of the city, and Hough's rate of participation in the Aid to
Dependent Children ~rogram almost doubled that of the rest of the city. About twenty
per cent of the major crimes in the city were committed in Hough, and the crime rate
there had tripled since 1950. 10 All of these factors coupled with inadequate govern-
ment services combined to give the ghetto's residents little reason to care about the
nelghbo:rhood. 11 As a re~ult, most of tht: people who lIved there did not care about
the community, 8S shown rather effectively in July, 1966, and by the reactions of the
community following the disorder~. The reactions were similar to those of a tQnant
in one of the slum's apartments. "If I come back after death," he stated bitterly,
'11 want to come back as a tiger and tear up Hough.,,12
The businessman driVing to him home in the eastern suburbs from his office down-
town would see only a glimpse of the life behind the invisible walls surrounding the
area known as Hough. Although he would see rows of dilapidated houses and streets
with nothing but garish bars and small store-front churches, he could not have much
empathy for the dwellers inside the walls nor much understanding of the smoldering
fire within the ghetto. The white middle-class experience prohibited full understand-
ing of the black ghetto because the values, institutions, and moreS inside the ~alls
of Hough were so different from those of the surrounding areas. Thus, the experience
of Hough coupled with a lar;k of under:;tanding and empathy by the white community helped
the vicious cycle to spiral on downward. Few people outside the ghetto realized the
consequences.
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The Events Preceding the Riots
Disorder did not erupt as a result of a single
"tri ggering" or "precipi tating" inci dent o Instead,
it was generated out of an increasingly disturbed
social atmosphere, in which a series of tension-
heightening incidents over a period of weeks or
months became linked in the minds of many in the
Negro community with a reservoir of underlying
gri evances. 1J
Many events led up to the precipitating incident in the Seventy-Niners~ Cafe on
July 18. Although Some of the events touch on some underlying causeS of the riots,
thcGe incidents provide the back6L-VUIld for a clearer under:standlng of the disorders.
It is necessary to begin in 1963, when Ralph S. Locher, law director of the city,
succpedpd Anthony J. Cel~bree7e as Mayor of Cleveland After Celehrcc2c was appointed
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
Mayor Locher's relations with the black community progressively declined from the
moment he became mayor. At first he met with leaders of 'fresponsible" groups to dis-
cuss "reasonable demands," but that effort WBS discontinued after awhile. In the SUm-
mer of 1963, a masS rape of a white girl by black youths almost incited violence. The
group had stabbed the girl's boyfriend repeatedly in the incident, and mass retalia-
tion and violence appeared inevitable. To avert trouble, Locher asserted his author~
ity and pressed for immediate and heavy punishment. His actions did not endear him to
the bl~ community, most of whom felt that the white establishment did not understand
many of the deeper sociological implications of the incident. The next major incident
occurred in the spring of 1964. Some black citizens and civil right5 group~ Lrled to
impede construction of a new school in a black neighborhood on the East Side because
the school would perpetuate ~~ ~pgregation. Locher att~mpted to r~solve the
differences by a series of conferences which produced no positive results. The aliena-
tion of the blacks from Locher was completed when Reverend Bruce Klwnder was acciden.
tally killed by a bulldozer at the site of the proposed school during a demonstration. 14
At this time, Ruth Turner, a graduate of Oberlin College and a fullQtime CORE worker
in Cleveland, commented that Cleveland was a f'polarized community by Virtue of the
fact that a vacuum has been created in the white community through apathy, and that
VaCuum has been filled by people who would rather scream Communism than address them-
selves to the real grievances" of the community.lS Her words, uttered in 1965, were
very prophetic.
A measure of the polarization between the black community and Mayor Locher oc-
curred in the Spring of 1965, when Locher proposed an income tax of one per cent on
gross income to generate new revenue and prOVide new services. The tax was to be used
for hiring extra police and firemen, raising the pay of city employees, funding addi-
tional staff members for the housing and recreation departments J improvement of the
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street lighting and air and water pollution control and demolition of abandoned houses.
The measure was widely endorsed by influential organizations throughout the community,
and it was eVen backed by the Negro-run and owned newspaper, the Call and~. The
tax was opposed by only the Chamber of Commerce, the Citizens' League, and the NAACP.
but the proposal waS soundly crushed at the polls, 89,290 to 62,816. The difference
occurred because che black wardS had voted overwhelmingly against the tax. In Hough,
the vote waS 3,525 for the tax to 6,789 opposed, and Hough was typical of most of the
other black communities in its voting behavior. It wa~ noted that many of the resl~
dents of Hough had nothing to lose by voting for the measure because people who were
on welfare relief would not have be~n taxed. Most observers concluded, however, that
most black citizens did not faYor the measure because the revenues would not have been
used to measurably improve tne lot of the people in the black neighborhoods ~ because
the black community was very disenchanted with the Locher administration. 16
The voters had a chance the next November to directly express their dissatis-
faction with Mayor Locher in the election for Mayor. The black community united be-
hind a little-known State representative from one of the black wards, Carl Stokes.
With the Republican candidate siphoning off a few white votes, Stokes, running as an
independent Democrat (after losing the party nomination in a primary), came within
2,000 votes of unseating Mayor Locher. Black power, demonstrated in terms of votes
at the polls, had almost succeeded 1n directly influencing the decisions to be made
ate i t Y Ha I!.
During this period of time, some efforts were made to reach the youths of the
ghetto. Unfortunately, these programs were usually failurp~ hpcause of executive. ad-
ministrative, and planning inadequacies. A good example of such a program was the Com-
munity Action for Youth Program (CAY), chartered in 1962. The expressed goals of this
program were to decrease juvenile delinquency, to build youth aspirations, to stimu-
late educational and occupational achievement, and to strengthen the role of the
father in the family. However, in the words of one conservative reporter, "CAY turned
out to be the biggest bust since Edsel.,,17 The program was reported to have been
plagued by many intra-agency personality conflicts and a high rate of personnel turn-
over. The personnel involved in the program often came in from other communities for
"experience,·· and as a result were someclmes incompetent and unempathetlc, with little
understanding of the problems facing Cleveland or Hough. Attempts to give top prior-
ity to child neglect and family cases were occasionally sabotaged because of a lack of
personnel, low wages, and the press of intake caSes in the Hough area. Services to
unwed mothers, pre-adolescent youngsters with learning difficulties, and RcttvitieQ
for "aggressive" boys were often inadequate, and the drop-out rate was very high.
Many of the proposals for youth camps, after-school programs, and pilot programs for
unwed fathers never even achieved reality because of the many problems which beset CAY.
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(Notes on Cleveland's Nine Poverty Neighborhoods)
In 1959 99,138 residents of the•• nine neighborhoods were below the "poverty
line", by 1904 this number had dropped to 93,424. In 1959 66 perCeDt of the in-
dividuals living i. poverty in Cleveland were concentrated In th••e nine neigh-
borhoods, by 1964 this figure had risen to 69 percent· althougb In 1964 these
aiDe Dei&bborhood. included ouly 39 perceDt of the Claveland population 8. com-
pared to 41 percent in 1959.
The number of children under 14 year. of ase livinS in poverty in these nine
neighborhoods rose froQl 36,157 in 1959 to 38,166 in 1964 - despite a seven percent
decrease In the number of children in this age group in these nine neighborhood.
In all of the City of Cleveland there were 46,560 children under 14 years of age
liVing below the poverty line. !his number is apprOXimately equal to the ~
number of children in that age range in Lakewood, ,arma and Shaker Heights com-
bined.
In 1960 less than one-half (47.6 percent) of the residents, flve years old
and older, nad been living in the same house for five years or longer and in
Hough only 22 percent had not moved during the previous five year.. In 1965 the
mobility rate was almost exactly the same (47.21 were in the same house aa five
years earlier) and Hough again led in mobility as less than one-tbird of the














The goala and Ideas ot CAY were widely accepted within the community. However, the
program ended without measurably improving the status of the ghetto dwellers, and
many of the workcro in the program left for otner ar~aS with high~r ~alarl~s and jOb5
because of their "contributions" to the Hough community.
In the spring of 1966. the United States Civil Rights Commission held hearings
in Cleveland for seven days, and in a report issued later diagnosed Clevelandis ills
to be "the classic ones of the ghetto! inadequate housing, schools and jobs_ Hl8 The
hearings were widely publicized in the city, and many citizens testified about the
cityijs g~ave problems. Many of the underlying causes of the disorders three months
later were spelled out in detail by the testimony at the hearings. The result of the
Commission's week in Cleveland was a new awareneSS in both the total community and the
black neighborhoodS ot the deplorable conditions in which the majority of Cleveland's
black citizens existed. Unfortunately, the sntuation was not improving.
At the beginnins of the summer, many Hough residents were among the group of
marchers that walked from Cleveland to Columbus in an effort to secure more welfare
relief. 19 The group's request was turned down by an unsympathetic Governor Rhodes,
and the long, hot summer began on a rather discouraging note for many of Clevelandvs
black citizens. The outlook worsened as the community Soon saw racial tension rise to
new heights.
Relations between the black and white citizens living on opposite sides of the
northern border of the Hough area had always been strained. Negro youths had attacked
a white father and son there in January, 1966, and as the school year closed that spring,
many anti-Negro Signs were painted in a park north of Hough. There were also many in-
stances of interracial fighting that occurred at the beginning of the summer. Black
residents of the area became quite pertu~bed when the attack~ cuntinued and police
did not seem to do anything to alleviate the tension between the two groups. Finally,
on June 22, two black youths were attacked by a gang of whites in th~ Sowinski ar~a at
the northern outskirts of Hough. A crowd gathered after the incident and confronted
police with evidence including a description of the attackers and the automobile in
which they were riding. The police ostensibly refused to investigate or pursue the
youths, and soon rocks and bottles were being hurled at both police and passing cars.
Area residents met the next day on three separate occasions with city officials and
law enforcement officers, but no positive actio~ was taken in response to the resi-
dents V complaints. That night, fueled by the frustration and anger that had been
building up oVer the months, groups of neighborhood black youths destroyed Some prop-
erty and continued the missile barrage un passing car5. A boy was allegedly shot by
a white man in a passing car, and when residents linked the car to the owner of a
npighhorhond ~llpermarket. the store was immediately torche~ Much damA8Q was inflictgd
on several other white-owned businesses on Superior Avenue in the three nights of
trouble that so ominously forewarned of the disturbances in July. o~ Saturday, June
25, a meeting was held between area residents, youth and the mayor. The group aired
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its grievances and made specific recommendations to the city's chief executive t most
of which concerned police t recreation, and urban renewal. That night, the disturbances
ceased, and only minor incidents of rock throwing along Superior Avenue were reported
for the next several days.20
In analyzing the situation, Assistant Safety Dlrector Richard McKean had noted
that there HwaS no danger of a Watt~ riot" in Clevelana. He claimed that he had faith
in the~aw~abiding"people of Cleveland. Safety Director John McCormick added, "We're
p~~par~d to deal with the situation,,,2l and it appeared that most 6£ the officials
closely connected with the safety of the City of Cleveland did not have the foreSight
that would have enabled them to have quickly and effectively halted the riots in the
Hough area once they began. Thus, the disturbances on Superior Avenue were not recog-
nized to be the omen that they actually were. The City reacted as if almost nothing had
happened.
As the disturbances on Superior Avenue ended, Ralph FindleYt Director of the
Greater Cleveland Office of Economic Opportunity, announced the cityQs plans to keep
the idle youths of the city busy. Clevela~d was set to spend almost one and a half mil-
lion dollars in programs involving inner-city youth. with the federal and city govern-
ments paying most of the bill. These programs included opportunities for jobless young-
sters to work in their neighborhoods and organize playground groups to keep other
children off the streets and jobs to work as playground helpers. Also available to
the cityWs youth were many jobs in institutions and government agencies, and the school
system offered about 1500 jobs for high school students. The Neighborhood Youth Corps
and Opportunity Centers sought to aid the students by providing some 1300 jobs, and
the Welfare Federation provided opportunities for seventy-five young leaders. The list
went on further, and most people connected with the effort to provide jobs agreed that
there were enough opportunities to accommodate every youth who desired work. 22 As the
hot summer stretched into July, job opportunities had greatly increased for the unem-
ployed youth t but the other eVents 1n June had caused a simultaneous increase in racial
tension.
On July 1, plans were revealed for the downtown expansion of Cleveland State Uni-
versity. The project was to cost a few million dollars, and tne resentment and cynicism
that these plans evoked in the black community were plainlY evidenced by the negative
reactions of such black leaders as Councilman Leo Jackson and Ernest Cooper, director
of the Urban League. 23 Obviously, with the problems faced by the black community in
Cleveland, its residents would be less than enthusiastic about an expensive project
that would not benefit them either directly or indirectly.
Fifty of the black community's leaders met with Mayor Locher on July 5 to offer
their help to the mayor in his efforts to relieve racial tension within the city. The
group presented the mayor with an eight point program that they believed would help to
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meet many of the black communityQs problems that had arisen in the previous months o
These suggestions to the mayor included a request for the police department to fully
support law and order and to treat all persons equally when making arrests. They also
called for an investigation into the shooting of a ten-year=old boy during the Superior
incidents twelve days earlier. an explanation by the police of the absence of any ar-
rests for the shooting. and an investigation by the police into the source of leader-
ship distributing incendiary race-hatred literature in the black community. The lead-
ers also requested the appointment of a special mayor 9 s committee to make recommenda~
tions to help ease the racial tension, and the ordering of specially trained police
into tense neighborhoods, to be kept there until the trouble had disappeared. ThE' group
ended its list of suggestions with a broad appeal for racial amityo After the meeting,
Mayor Locher stated that the efforts were "entirely constructive.,.,24
However, constructive as the black leaders' efforts were, the rest of the commu~
nity remained frustrated and aggravated. Mayor Locher had met with Secretary of Health,
Education and welfare Robert Weaver early in the summer, and Weaver had given Locher a
list of the cityQs responsibilities to improve the stagnating East Side which included
measures to ~plift the buuslng, derelict bUildings, parking facilities, garbage collec-
tion and playgrounds. Locher did very little to satisfy Weaverqs recommendations, and
as a r~sult, the city lost a federal grant of $1,500.000 for parks and playground$.25
Meanwhile, the city's urban renewal program remained mired in red tape. The Uni~
versity~Euclid Project of rehabilitation for part of the Houzh area had stood almost
still since its inception in 1962. With the goal of rebuilding some of the sturdier
structures of the area to preserve and improve the neighborhood, the city had estimated
in 1962 that the project would be completed in June, 1967 0 The project had first been
approvE'd by David Walker, then a commissioner of urban renewal for the federal govern-
ment 6 The city later hired Walker as a consultant in 1964 to "speed up" the rehabili-
tation program, but Walker announced in May, 1966, that the project would not be fino
ished by its u~iginal target date, and set no date for its completion. 26 By June of
1966, only twelve per cent of the planned rehabilitation had been completed. It was
also ~id~ly rumor~d that the federal government would aoon cut o££ all new fWIU~ fur
the badly boggled urban renewal plans.
In Columbus, the State Legislature conducted hearings on propos~d Ipgislation
that would abolish capital punishment. One of those officials testifying for reten o
tion of the death penalty was Cleveland's Chief of Police, Richard R. Wagner. Wagner
claimed that the death penalty was an effective deterrent to many black nationalists
who plotted to kill. When the civil rights leadership of Cleveland heard WagnerVs
statements before the legislature, they rE'quested again to meet with the mayor in oro
der to air their grievances about the police chief's attitudes. Mayor Locher would
not see them, however, and the group waited in his office for three days in a vain at-
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tempt to gain a hearing. 27 When, at the end of the third day of protest, the group de-
cided to stay overnight, the mayor had them arrested and thrown in jail. 28 Tension be-
tween the mayor and the black community heightened to the breaking point.
Chic~go erupted in violence and destruction on July 12th, 13th and 14th. The dam-
age was not too extensive, but the action was portentous of disorders to come. The
events 1n Cleveland over the months and years before July, 1966, made the city a likely
spot for Violence and destruction. Tension had heightened, relations had become strained
between the city government and llle black community, and t.he social conditionS of the
black ghetto, the real underlying causes of the disorders, had become intolerable.
The Underlying Social Conditions
Many conditions caused the outbreaks of disorder in Hough. Certainly some factors
were much more important and rt:h:vaul I.han others, but each contributed to the final
outburst of frustration and despair which exploded on Cleveland's East Side for those
five days in July. 1966.
The deplorable social and economic conditions existing in the ghetto gave rise to
many of the incidents which finally led to the violence and destruction. These same
conditions were also the basis for the general frustration and accumulated dissatis~
faction which combined with the inciting series of events to produce the rampant dis~
arde r.
Many people pointed to the vicious cycle that entrapped Hough's black reSidents --
housing, jobs, and education -- as the primary factor behind the frustration and bit-
terness so prevalent in the ghetto. Others mentioned that these causes had been com-
pounded by poor police-community relations, a senSe of impotence within the black com~
munity, inadequate welfare levels, poor recreation facilities and programs, and irregu-
lar garbage oollections. Certainly, all the~e fa~cors were 1nterrelated, and each con-
tributed to the disorder. These pitiful social and economic conditions were perpe-
trated. explained and" tolpr~t~d by an underlying raoism -- the belief that blaek people
are inferior to white people. The latent but omnipresent racism of the community only
served Lo push the cycle or poverty, inadequate huusiug and schools further downward,
and served as the basis by which the tangible factors became important contributors to
the decay of the community.
Inadequate Housing
I would love to live in a
regular house. 29
Much of urban life centers around housing. Location of residence often determines
the opportur.ities for gainful employment, for education, and for many other benefits of
urban life. The black community of Cleveland was subjected to a shortage of adequate
housing, poor and crowded liVing conditions, and racial discrimination when black resi~
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dents tried to move. these charges were all well documented in the Special Census of
1965, the hearings before the Civil Rights Commission in April, 1966, and the PATH re-
port, issued in Marcn, 1967, after six months of investigation by a group of thirty
citizens. 30
In the period-from 1950 to 1967, orily 30,000 new dwelling units were constructed
within the city as compared to about 150,000 units constructed in the suburbs through-
out the rest of the county.3l With only five per cent of the countyGs black residents
living in the suburbs, there was an increasing shortage of new housing in the city
available to blacks compared to whites. 32 The existing dwellings within the city were
deteriorating during this time, too. The 1960 Census showed 50,000 unit5 within the
city as substandard, and in 1966, despite the demo11tion of some 10,000 units~ there
were still about 50.000 substandard dwellings inside the city.33 Thes~ statistics
hit areas like Hough particularly hard, especially as the community became more and
more segregated as whites moved out. Ma~y people testified at the Civil Rights Commis~
sian Hearings about the deteriorated conditions in which they were" forced to live, and
the difficulty black residents had securing loans from any of the financial institu~
tions to finance new construction in the blighted areas such as Hough. Thus, because of
the residential patterns of the city and the unwritten rules of segregation, there
weren~t many housing and dwelling opportunities for black citizens of the inner=city.
Those opportunities that did exist in Hough were considerably less than attrac-
tive. M3ny individuals testified at the hearings in April about the conditions of Houghgs
housing. The absentee landlords rarely responded to complaints of their tenants, and
because of the city's lax methods of enforcing the hOUSing codp, condition~ of squAlo~
and total deterioration often went unnoticed and uncorrected. The testimony of the
Commissioner of Housing demonstrated that the city's housing code was not strictly en-
forced because of a personnel shortage as well as political pressures exerted on the
city government. In areas of urban renewal, it was disclosed that the codes were never
enforced because the jurisdiction for enforcement was changed to the department of ur~
ban renewal. As a result of the code practices, absentee landlords often let their
property totally deteriorate and rarely made substantial improvements. ApprOXimately
50,000 substandard dwellings stood within the city at the 1960 census, but the Commis-
sioner of Housing disclosed that in 1965 only 299 warrants were issued by the courts
that dealt with hOUSing code violations. There were no warrants issued to landowners
in the area affected by the urban reneWAl plans. 34
The Success of the urban renewal programs in the ghetto was Virtually nonexistent.
As the pATH report accurately summed up, Cleveland's urban renewal program had been a
failure in the years before the riots. The program had not added to the housing supply
of the city nor had it succeeded in blocking further deterioration of the community's
dwellings, The area's largest project, the University~Euclid project, was centered on
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the East Side of town, and it had planned to rehabilitate over 4,000 units in 1961. In
late 1966, despite the fact that its administrative budget had been used up, the project
had only rehabilitated about 600 units.
The urban renewal programs suffered from several defects, among them: inadequate
planning and slow execution of plans that were made; lax enforcement of housing code in
renewal areas; ineffe~tive and arLen discriminatory relocation assistance to families
that had to be moved during the renovation process; and lack of resident participation
and consent on thp goalR and methods of attaining the goals of the progr~m.35 Re5~arch
data pr~sented at the Civil Rights Commission hearings showed that only fifteen per
cent of all the families relocated in the most recent projects befor~ Ig66 w~nt to
housing to which they were referred by the relocation office. In University-Euclid,
data showed that of 383 black families that were relocated, only 76 resettled in cenSUS
tracts that were less than fifty per cent black. Almost half of those displaced settled
in census tracts that were more than ninety per cent Negro, thus compounding the ghetto
problems. J6 Earlier, other downtown urban renewal projects had dislocated many residents
from their homes, but rather than smoothly assimilating into the outlying suburbs like
other displaced ethnic groups, the Negroes were almost forced to move into already
crowded black neighborhoods. Ghettos like Houg& were the inevitable result of these
urban renewal efforts. 37 Cleveland also illustrated another shortcoming of many urban
renewal programs that was mentioned by Robert Weaver -- the disregard for democracy which
seemed to characteri~e many of Cleveland's efforts. Cleveland could very well have beef!
the city to which Weaver alluded when he wrote that in one community, Some new greeting
cards were circulated. On the cover, the cards read. "Urban Renewal is Goad for YOll,"
and on the inside flap the cards said, HSO Shut Up.H38
Cleveland's Urban Renewal Director until January, 1966, James Lister~ illustrated
a rather uninformed attitude toward the entire concept of urban renewal and planning
in 1965 when he said, HEven.if we don't find ready builders (for a project) •• 0 l,
just clearing the land to get rid of those slums justifies what we are doing."39
According to Lister, desoluation was a blessing, and his department appeared to have
been guided by that princ1ple during the time of his direction. Lister was replaced in
March of 1966 by Barton Clausen, a man formerly associated with television broadcasting
with no previous experience in either actual urban planning or urban renewal. The pro-
gram continued along at its feeble pace until finally in January, 1967~ the Department
of Housing and Urban Development announcpd that no new funds for urban planning or re-
newal would be allocated to Cleveland until the present problems were solved and the
entire project restructured. 40
Even the department's public information officials were not impressed with the de-
partment's record over the last five or ten years. One official remarked, "Wewve had
some bad failures and good successes," while another city employee frankly admitted,
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"Urban renewal hasn't been the brightest light om our horizon. H41
Discrimination was actively practiced against black citizens in the sale of hous~
ing in Cleveland, and so the walls of Hough became nearly impossible to scale. Many young
educated Negroes testified that they were often not shown housing in white areas by real-
tors, and often their names were referred to black realtors by the white realtors whom
they had contacted. Mr. and Mrs. Robert Crumpler related an incident t~ the Civil
Rights Commission that was typical of tne plight of many Negroes. Mr. Crumpler, a black
elementary school sCience teacher. and his wife, a white, had sought to rent a home in
Cleveland Heights, a middle class suburb on Cleveland's East Side. After reaching verbal
agreement with Hr. Crumpler to rent over the telephone, the owner talked with a present
tenant and discovered that Mr. Crumpler was black. Suddenly, the lady talked again to Mr.
Crumpler and explained that hpr ~hild h~d ~ont~acted measles and so she couldn't have a
contract for several days. An hour later, the owner rented the apartment to a white
Couple. As Mr. Crumpler later testified, the measles of the owner's son were ~possibly
the fastest case in history.H42
The suburbs were Virtually closed to ,Negro migration. Of the more than fifty muni-
Cipalities surrounding the City of Cleveland. only three had allowed more than a few
Negroes to live in their communities, and even in these places, the process of integra-
tion was a very slov and uneasy one. Because of this denial of housing opportunities,
the demand for housing in the city by blacks was very high. The result was that Negroes
often had to pay more than whites for housing of an inferior quality. Even 1n the place-
ment of people by the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, the public housing de~
partmgnt, there was evidence of some discrimination. It was documented in the Clvil
Rights Commission hearings that 997. of the white tenants in public housing lived in pre~
dominantly white estates, and about 811. of thp black tenants livpd in thTPP pTPnomin~n~~
ly Negro projects. Occupancy statistics of public housing indicated that white tenants
comprised fifty-three per cent of the total while blacks comprised about forty-seven
per cent. 43
The housing problems of the Negro in Cleveland were monumental in the years before
the Hough disorders. A shortage of available dwellings, terrible liVing conditions that
were rarely corrected, an inept urban renewal program, and Widespread racial discrimina-
tion worked an even greater hardship on the residents of Hough. The ghetto became sever-
ed from the test of the community, and the living conditions there were often unbearable.
The ghetto was bound to explode,
Unemployment and Underemployment
Cleveland has an ordinance which prohibits em~
players, employees, labor unions, and employment
agencies from discriminating on the basis Of race,
creed, color or national origin. 44
~50-
Unemployment and under employment are firmly entrenched in the ghettoo Unemploy-
ment of the labor force in any area can result in further problems for the society,
and in the ghetto, these problems assume a much greater importanceo Other conditions
are present there that compound the problems of the unemployed. Similarly, underem-
ployment has auv~rse effects, psychological and otherwise. on the inhabitants of the
ghetto. Menial jobs with little chance for advancement, creativity, or enjoyment, are
often not thp An9~er to the problems of unemployment. and as a result, underemployment
often does more to reinforce the "revolution of rising expectations" than to alleviate
the problem of unemployment.
Hough residents were victimes of both unemployment and underemployment o In 1965.
Negroes comprised about one-sixth of Cleveland's metropolitan labor force of 885,000.
Unemployment was estimated at 2.9% of the labor force 1n July of the Same yearo 45 At
this same time, unemployment within the city was at 7.17., and for the black workers
within the City of Cleveland, the situation was even worse, unemployment averaging
about four per cent higher than the mark for the entire citYo Thus, unemployment for
black5 ran about three times higher than the rates for w~ites within the citYo The
Hough neighborhood showed an even higher rate of unemployment, with 13.4% of the male
labor force and l7~5% of the female labor force recorded as unemployed~ but the black
r~sidents of Hough hit an even lower figure, as 14.3% of the black male labor force
and 19.1% of the black female labor force in Hough were unpmploypd du~in8 the 1965
special Census in Cleveland. 46 Unemployment among the black people of Hough waS
worse than their white neighbors in the ghetto and drastically worse than among even
other Negroes throughout the city. However, the black resident of Hough faced other
problems even when he was employed.
If he were employed in the building industry, he would have had difficulty getting
good jobs and remaining continually employed because he wouldn't have been in a trade
union. In 1965, the total un10n membership in building trade unions was 7t 786o Of
this total only 55 members were black, less than one per cent of the total, despite
thp fact that a higher percentage of Negroes were in the induat rYo 47
Clevelandis black citizens also had difficulty securing employment in white collar
jobso In 1965, about forty per cent of employ@d whitp males h~d white collar jobs,
while only fifteen per cent of employed black males were in jobs of this nature o On
the other hand, sixty-three per cent of the black male employed labor force were in
blue collar jobs, compared to only forty-nine per cent of the white males In such
jobs. 48 Many government sponsored training programs were instituted in Cleveland in
1965. but most of the Negroes that were selected for these programs were taught semi-
siilled professions, Even the status of trainees that completed the training program
funded by the Manpower Dev@lopment and Training Act indicated that the black ci thens
of Cleveland were coming out second best. The white trainees reported a rate of un-
employment of 18.5% for all white trainees, buL Lhe figure for black unemployment out
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of total black trainees was 26.7%.49
The problem of unemployment was compounded by other factors involving black em~
ployment. The men and the women of the ghetto, when they were employed, were often
relegated to the lowest and most menial positions. Even training programs found fewer
of their black graduates employed than the white graduates. The black people of Hough
faced great barriers in their attempts to secure gainful employment. Part of the rea-
son they rioted was to pull down some of these barriers.
Inferior Education
Negro students as a group consistently score in
the lower ranges on standardized tests, and the
divergence between white and Negro academic per~
formance increases over the child's academic career. 50
Inferior education is the third major component of the ghetto cycle of life. Com-
bined ..itn inadequate housing dnd uno;uqJloYIllt:ut, iJuur educatluu lIt:lplj 1.0 lock the ghetto
inhabitants in their impoverished pattern of life forever. The residents of Hough saw
their children receivp a spgrpgatpd and v~ry in~dequate Qduc~tion. This condition
only increased the bitterness and frustration of the black communityo
Cleveland~s educational system was based on the nelghborhoodprlnciple -. chIldren
attended schools in their own neighborhoods~ the schools that had the closest geogra=
phical proximity. Residential segregation, therefore, resulted in educational segre-
gation. L~ OCtober of 1965, eighty-three per cent of all students attending public
schools in Cleveland attended schools that were more than ninety~five per cent white
or black, in their racial composition. About ninety~one per cent of the students at-
tended schools with eighty per cent or more of a racial imbalance. and in elementary
schools. oVt:r nln~ty ~t:C ~e[IL uf lbe cbildren aLtended schools with more than n1ne~y­
five ?er cent white or black students attending them. 51 Newly constructed schools
only p~rp~tuated ~~ segregation. In all but two of the twenty-~even new 5chool~
that were constructed in the few years prior to 1965, the racial imbalance was greater
than ninety per cent. Black teachers were very rare in predominantly white schools --
only five per cent of the teachers in the whi te schools were black o The reverse trend
was true in predominantly black schools. and from the statistics presented by the
Civil Rights Commission Staff, it was rather obvious that new teachers had been as-
signed partly on the basis of race. There were twenty~three Negro principals in the
school system in 1965, and twenty-one of them supervised schools that were more than
ninety.five per cent black. Even in the advanced enrichment programs that were offer-
ed to students with high academic potential, more than eighty per cent of the Stu-
dents attended schools with a racial imbalance greater than ninety~five per cent. 52
The quality of education in the predominantly Negro sohoo1$ was inferior to that
received in, the white schools. A comparison of standardized test scores showed that
by the sixth grade, students in predominantly black schools were more than one grade
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behind their counterparts at white schools, and this difference had increased from
only a half-grade difference that had been present at the first grade level. The re-
sults of tne Probable Learning Rate Tests also showed that the students at predomi-
nantly black schools were learning at a slower rate than other students. 53 The drop-
out rates at the segregated black schools were also much higher than they were at
the white schools -- 14.64 of the student body per year for black schools compared
to 6.5~ 8 year for the white schools. 54
In 1962. tne Greater Cleveland A5~ociated Fede.atlon designated a group of citi-
zens to formulate a seven year plan for improving the city's educational system. In
April, 1963. the committee mad~ a report of its findin8~ and reoommendations, and they
focused considerable attention on the deteriorating state of the Cleveland and ghetto
school districts. The PACE (Plan for Action by Citizens in Education) report called
for a commitment by the entire community to upgrade the quality of the public educa -
tion in the city. However, in 1965. the staff of the Civil Rights Commission was able
to report. "Since pUblication of the PACE report. there has been little change in the
systemo"55 A new school superintendent, Dr. Paul Briggs, was hired in 1964, however.
and soon he announced th~t he intended to eliminate much of the criticism directed at
the school system by improving the quality of education and increasing integration.
Such progreSSive idea~, however, had not been very widely implemented by the spring
of 1966, and the school system for the vast majority of the city's black citizens
remained inf~~ior.
The City of Cleveland spent about one-half as much as some of the richer suburbs
for the education of its students. Cleveland's cost per pupil~ of $436.90 per YQar
placed it among the very lowest districts in Cuyahoga County, and its student-teacher
ratio was the highest in the county at thirty to one. 56 Thus. even within the city's
inadequately staffed and financed school district, the bulk of the black students re-
ceived an inferior education. This fact was most detrimental to impoverished pockets
of black life such as Hough. because in these areas, one of the only hopes of escape
was a decent education. The residents of Hough did not receive even that hope~
Hough'S black restdents thus experienced the classic conditions of discrimination
and poverty inadequate hOUsing, unemployment, and inferior education. Other Negroes
in the rest of the city also e~periel1ced ~he5e phenomena to a lesser extent. Only in
Hough were these conditions all prevalent simultaneously with a severity not exper-
ienced throughout th@ r~st of the city. But even these olassio oonditions were fur-
ther compounded by other adverse factors in the Hough community such as inadequate
welfare levels and poor police relations. These conditions also collaborated in ig-
niting the destruction and violence of the 1966 summer.
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Inadequate Welfare -- Aid to De~endent Children
••• our present system of public assistance contributes
materially to the tensions and social disorganization that
have led to civil disorders. 57
There were seven programs of welfare and relief that were administered by the
Cuyahoga County Department of Welfare in 1966. The most costly and widespread of
these programs was the Aid to Dependent Children (AOC). This relief was directed at
families and children without a family head who could provide a source of income.
Two-thirds of the program was federally financed, but administration of the welfare
was left up to the county units.
Cuyahoga County had a total of lOt3ll cases of families on ADC in 1966. About
eighty-seven per cent of thp p~rAon~ involved in this welfare were black, and about
one out of every four families in Hough were on ADC. To be eligible for payments,
a family's income could not exceed $165 a month. This standard of eligibility placed
Ohio sixteenth in the nation despite Ohio's eighth place ranking in per capita income.
Other states with high per capita income, such as New York, allowed families to earn
much more than $165 a month without taking them off welfare.
The standard of welfare payments for ADC was set in 1959 and had not been changed
since then in Jpite of the rising cost of living and inflsted prices. 58 Unfortunately,
the county dld not even meet the 1959 standards in the actual ADC payments made. In-
ste~d, in 1966 t the average payment was only 76% or the established standard. Payments
to a family of four on ADC remained constant during the period from 1960 to 1966 t and
~s a result, the position of tne recipients of ADC, in t::conomlc term::;, hCld declined
drastically.59 The ADC payment to a family of four headed by a female, was only
seventy.one per cent of the povprty lpvpl of exigtpnce set hy the Social Security Ad-
ministration in 1964. Even allowing for a food stamp bonus in which a family could
receive extra food at minimal cost, tne cash payment and medical allowance of the
ADC program was still only eighty per cent of the Social Security poverty index. 60
Food allowan~e payments averaged only sixty per cent of the standard bUdget figure
Set in 1959 for "food and other" expenses. And yet t all other welfare programs ad e
ministered by the county were paying higher than ninety-five per cent of their stan-
dard bUdgets set in 1959. 61
Hough's dependence on the ADC program resulted in extremely adverse effects for
. the area because of the inadequate welfare payments. Coupled wi th the extremely low
payments was the problem that merchants in Hough often raised their prices on the
tenth of E"Very month. "Mother's DAy" as it was known in Hougn t when ACe checks were
issued. Sales at stores were strategically held at the end of every month when few of
the recipients of ADC had any money, and often stores in the area required a certain
amount of goods to be purchased before they would cash any ADC checks. 62
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For an additional child. the incremental payment of ADC wOrked out to be seventy-
three cents a day. Although many persons felt that the welfare structure of Aid to
Dependent Children encouraged women to have more children, it was rather dubious that
women would have children merely to receive an additional seventy-three cents a day.
The program did not reach many ghetto inhabitants that needed welfare and discouraged
many recipients from seeking work because of the low eligibility standardso By remain-
ing in the ghetto for extended periods of time, it was only natural for the women on'
ADC to have large numbers of children, for in a slum like Hough, the next day was the
"unimaginable future," and nine months was "an absurdity.,,63
Th~ welfare gtructure which prevailed in the sheeto only compounded the odve~~e
conditions that originally led to the need for some form of welfare. The welfare that
was received only added further tinder that soon ignited.
Police Practices
There evidently is a sharp difference in
feeling toward the police between the Negro
and white citizens of Cleveland. 64
The attitudes of the Hough community toward the police were very apparent once
disorder had erupted in the community~ Lat~nt hostility and bitterness quickly rose
to the surface once the looting and vandalism began in July, and therefore. attitudes
toward the police served as an important underlying cauSe of the rioting once it had
begun. The ghetto's feelings were justified by much evidence, but the attitudes were
also affected to some extent by Hough's own perception of the facts.
Before, during. and after the disorder had broken out in Hough, it was plain that
there were not cordial relationships between the police department and the Hough neigh-
borhood. In the spring hearings of the Civil Rights Commission, there were no witness-
eS from the black community that claimed the relations were good. Many witnesses re-
lated incidents of police brutality, and some complained of deficient protect1on in
the black ghettos. The black community's testimony was almost unanimous in its criti-
ciSm of the police department~ In tht" rlAyS hpfore the riots. a petition to City Hall
was circulated door-to-door throughout the Hough neighborhood that expressed ffdiscon~
tent at a seemingly biased and ineffectual Police Department.,,65 ~ring the actual
disorders, many residents of the area spoke bitterly of their disdain for the police
department. A group of young residents told a reporter that most of the people in
Hough were very troubled ~the police attitudes J and most people in the ghetto did
not have any respect or confidence in the department. one man said, "It would help
if the pol1ce stopped bugging us all the time, picking up people on the streets for
no reason. H66 Lawyer Stanley Tolliver stated that there was no respect for the
police in Hough because of their illicit money-making activities on the side, and
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Lewis G. Robinson added, "The only hoodlum~ Tue~day nigbt (~e~ond night of the riO~5)
were Mayor Locher 9 s blueshirted hoodlums."67 One unidentified nineteen-year-old told
report~rs that police stopppd him to sparch him with th~ words. "Stand still, Nieg~r.
Turn around. Nigger." Then they searched him for a knife and in the process ripped
some of his clothing. 68
After the disorders had ended, there were many public utterances and proclamations
by black leaders that the present relationships with the Police Department were intol~
erable. and the head of CORE, Baxter Hill. called for a police surveillance squad in
order to "patrol the police. H69 In the Citizens' Panel hearings, the police were of-
ten the subject of discussion, and the bulk of the recommendations in their report cen~
tered on methods to improve police-community relations. Much testimony of police bru q
tallty amJ l"<1ci:ot attltud~~ w~:> pJ."~S~!lL~rJ lou Lhi~ ~umlllittee, demurl:stratilll!J wlth llttle
doubt that the black community attitudes were very antagonistic toward the police.
The President's AdVisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that attitudes
toward police had been an important factor in catalyZing the conditions of frustration
into destructive action. The Commission stated that the police were symbols of white
racism and white repression to many Negroes, and that often police did, in fact~ ex~
press and reflect these white attitudes. ~The atmosphere of hostility and cynicism
is lelnforced." the Commission added. "by a widespread belief among Negroes in the ex-
istence of police brutality and in a 'double standard' of justice and protection -~
one for Negroes and one for whites."70 The statistics and facts of Cleveland serve
to partially substantiate such feelings of the black community.
In October, 1965, the rolice Department employed 2,021 people despite Its budgeted
authorization of more than 2,700 persons. only 133 of the Police Department personnel
WQrQ black. Of this group, only two men were above the rank of patrolman. Rnd they
both were sergeants. 7l Chief Wagner explained that the department was having great
difficulty recruiting both white and black applicants, but that it was making every
effort to attract qualified Negroes.
The city was divided into six districts, each with an office centrally located
within its geographical boundaries, to facilitate law enforcement throughout the en-
tire city.The Fifth District at the police network encompassed the Hough community
and included about 18% of the entire city 9 s population. This district, however, wit~
nessed more than a quarter of all the city's crime. Prostitution was the largest
single class of vice, and it accounted for more than one~third of the arre~ts in th~
district in the three years preceding 1966. 72 The complaints of the Hough reSidents
were basically within three related categories. First, they believed that police were
slower to respond to calls for help. within their district. Secondly, the people be~
lieved that the police did not enforce the law as strictly in the predominantly black
district as they did in other areas. Finally, many people complained about arrest
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procedures. They thought that the police were often unnecessarily brutal in making
arrests, that arrests were often made for no reaSon, and that complaints of citizens
against these abuses were not properly acknowledged.
Statistics of the police department did show that police were slower to respond
to calls in the Hough district than in other areas of the city. Appendix Four shows
a comparison of the time it took police to respond to calls in the Fifth District to
the times for the First and Second Districts, both predominantly white in their COm-
position. The toble was compiled from random checks on each district for every day
of the week. From the figures, it is clear that the response in Hough was much slower
than the response for the two white districts. The Fifth District had th~ slow~st
average response im ten of the eleven categories of incidents which occurred in all
districts. In the robbery category, response in the Fifth District was about four
times slower than in the two white districts, and in cases of burglary and housebreak·
ing without larceny, the response was more than twice as slow. 73 The police answered
the charges of slower response by claiming that the large number of calls coupled
with inadequate equipment made faster response impossible. They did not mention the
posSibility of reallocating 50me of their available resources.
The major thrust of the second complaint that the residents of Hough leveled at
the Pulice Dep<:lrtment was that vice offt::1l5e5 were not enforced a:s strictly in the
Hough area as they were in other places. The available statistics did not substantiate
this chl'lrgp. Npithpr did t.hp)' di!'lprnv<,> it:. Al'1'E'l'lt.s fnr pro!'lt.itlltion I'Ind g.a.mhling in.
creased in the Fifth District in 1965 from the previous year, and police vigorously
denied that there was any double standard involved in making arrests. 74 Total crime
in the area had decreased, but this decrease could at least partially be explained
by the decrease in population of the district as well as by strict police enforce-
ment~ Similarly, the increase in arrests of gamblers and prostitutes did not neces~
sarily indicate a strict policy of enforcement because increases in these vices might
have meant that a smaller percentage of offenders were caught. The black community,
however, persisted in its belief that the law was more loosely enforced within their
ull:lt.rlct.~
There were numerous occasions when Hough residents complained of brutal treat m
ment by the police. However. both PoLice Chief Wagner and Safety Director McCormick
proudly claimed that no investigations had ever sustained any case against a member
of the Folice Department. They neglected to mention that the system of handling com-
plaints that was used by the police was both archaic and ineffective. Complaints were
not systematically recorded. and when complaints were received, they were handled in
a rather flexible procedure by the ranking officer of the district in which the com-
plaint was lodged. If the complaints were serious enough (as judged by the district
officer) they were brought to the attention of Chief Wagner and even Director McCor·
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mick. Complaints could also be lodged through the Community Relations Board of city
government, but Chief Wagner had kept his men from appearing at the board's hearings
to answer charges that were made against them. 75
The attitudes of some Cleveland policemen were also responsible for much of the
black resentment in the ghetto. Professor Johm Ronayne of Fordham University, in a
study of the police department for the Civil Rights Commission, concluded that some
police believed "that eighty-five per cent of the crime in Cleveland is committed by
Negroes although thpy only make up about thirty to forty per cent of the cityts popu-
lation."76 This attitude partially explained why many black people were picked up In'
the Fifth District on suspicious person charges. The number of arrests made in other
districts on these charges were much lower. Hough residents often complained of being
arrested as "suspicious persons," and police records indicated that a higher percentage
of people in the Fifth District were arrested and later released without charge in in·
vestigations of robbery and prostitution than in the other police districts. Statis-
tics from 1965 indicated that 999 females in the Fifth District had been arrested for
investigation of prostitution, but that only 76 were formally charged with the offense.
The police said that the reason for this abundance of arrests was that there was often
evidence indicative of prostitution (e.g. waving at passing cars, talking to strangers,
etc.) thRt ~ould not have been sufficient to convict the females in courts of law.
Therefore, police had liberally arrested known prostitutes and other women who were
soliciting business despite the fact that theY had too little evidence to charge them
or convit them in order to eliminate the vice. However, it was also true that a dis-
portionate number of black males were arrested in the Fifth District for investigation
of robbery.77 Thus, the resentment of the black community toward the police department
was justified to an extent through the departmentts own statistics in the areas of
grievances and unnecessary arrests. Instances of police brutality were heavily disQ
puted by the police even though testimony by area residents had frequen~ly revealed,
mIstreatment.
The Hough residents had Some legitimate grievances to air agaInst abuses of police g
men in their diGtrict. The c~tablishcd mQcoAnismo for handlin8 gricvan~e~ And ~omplAinta
were ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of the community. Resentment and bitter-
neSs toward the police force ran deeply throughout the black community. Perhaps these
attitudes were some of the reasonS that the department had such difficulty recruiting
any more qualified Negroes. In any case, the hostility of the community toward police
authority and practices served as a very real and supporting cause in the ignition and
subsequent course of the Hough disorder.
Many other specific factors could be mentioned as underlying contributors to the
disoraer that occurred in Cleveland. Lack of recreation facilities in the ghetto, re~
lations with white merchants, and family instability were some of these other condi-
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tions that were prevalent in Hough.
All of the deplorable conditions in Hough resulted in a pervasive frustration that
was ingrined in almost every black resident. The cammon denominator among all the
specific causes of the frustration was the factor of race, and thus, the latent racism
of the community led ultimately to the ghetto's deep frustration ~- a frustration that
finally culminated in civil disorder.
Black Frustration
It happened because no one in Cleveland
careS anything for us out here. 78
In all the discussions with rioters throughout the disorders, one word was fre-
quently used -- frustration. The residents of Hough were frustrated in attempts to
partake 1n tne deCiSion-making process that determined their way of life. The resia
dents of Hough were frustrated in their efforts to secure better and decent housing.
The reSidents of Hough were fruatrated when they tried to secure ga1nful employment
and anything but menial jobs. The residents of Hough were frustrated by their in-
ability to improve abusive polic~ practices. And the residents of Hough were frus-
trated in their efforts to leave the ghetto and improve their socio-economic stand-
ing in the community.
Much of the black community regarded the Negroes in city government as sellouts
because they were so easily co-opted by the white establishment once they were elect-
ed. As a result, many of the-black citi~ens did not feel that there was any true
representation of the black community's interests in the city government. one woman
aptly Bummed up the ghetto's feelings when she told a reporter, ffTheyOre (black
elected officials) us's when we send them, but theY're not us~s when they get there."79
The remark illustrated the feeling uf frustration ingrained In the black citizen even
in the area of political influence. Thus, the ghetto dweller found all avenues of
hope through which h~ cmlld ~\n self~esteem blOCKgd -- blocked by in3dcquace educa-
tion and job discrimination, and by a system of political power that did not respond
to his needs Lewis Go Robinson echoed these sentiments when he stated that there
was "too much political expediency in the systemh ff80
The symbol of all the frustration that had built up was the ghetto itself" Hough
embodied everything that the black man had been forced to accept. Its physical ap-
pearance, its way of life~ its standards and mores •• all reflected the frustration
of the black community in its efforts to gain equality in a democracy. Because the
ghetto So symbolized the despair and defeat, it was only natural that those who had
been forced into it •• thuse whuse way of life was mired ln an endless downward spiral
of poverty and discrimination who had little to lose .- should attempt to destroy
th~ir own npie~hor~ood. This property held them captive in the ghetto and was a mani-
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Ee~tation of wnite power ~nd supremacy. Ong riotQr succinctly statQd this attitude
when he remarked~ "White man own the place. Prices too high. Like to see it burn."
He later added, with a subdued chuckle, HWhen people ~et through, ainOt gonns be no
Hough Q "81 Hough symbolized all that was bad for the black citizens of the nation o
It was impossible to identify one specific cause for the Hough riots. As a
newspaper reporter accurately asserted at the time of the disorders, it was too late
for the city to quickly remedy the problems that were responsible for the riots~
"because there (was) ••• no one problem at which to point an accusing finger with
deadly, bitter certainty."82 A combination of inequities and injustices which were
unescapable for the vast numbe~s of black people who found themselves 1n these atro-
cious conditions resulted in a general malaise and frustration which was certain to
finally culminate in civil di50rdcr~
Unfortunately, the white community and leadership did not have the empathy to
fully understand the situation of the black ghetto and to help alleviate its prob~
lems~ White from closely knit families in middle class America could not easily coma
prehend the problems of blacks from broken families in the ghetto. Similarly. the
black ghetto dweller had a distorted view of the world around him only because of
his limited experience in it. The tragedy of such misunderstanding and frustration
was the disorder that claimed human lives and resulted initially in the further
polarization of the two communities. The vicious cycle also included violence and
destructlono
As Kenneth Clark has pointed out, the poor have always been alienated from
society. They are rejected by society because of their low social and economic
standing. However, when the poor are black, as they have increasingly become in the
major urban centers. Ha double trauma exists. H83 The poor black man is also shackled
by the bonds of despair and frustration~ the resulting evils of racial discrimination.
The general frustration that evolved into destructive action emananted from deeply
ingrained racist notions of the Cleveland community.
White Racism
All my life~ people been
calling me Nigger. 84
Beneath the complex causes and interrelated phenomena that ignited the five
days of disorder in Cleveland was an intrinsic and widespread prejudice against the
black man that permeated almost every aspect of the white community.
Every available statistic substantiates the pattern of discrimination in Cleve~
land -- the second class citizenship afforded its black populatio. The figures'-show
that the black citizens of Cleveland, particularly those of Hough, were much poorer
in socio-economic terms than the rest of the community. The average of a black per-
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son's education was less than the average for whites, and this disparity was com-
pounded by the inferior quality of education that the blacks received. Median in-
come declined for the black people of Hough while it increased for everyone else.
Family instability was more prevalent in Hough than anywhere else in the city. Al-
though individual Negroes were occasionally accepted by the surrounding white society,
~aclsm impeded the development of the entire black community of Cleveland. Racism waS
the primary cause of the high incidence of residential segregation within the city
a~ well as the ramifiCQtions of this pattern. Discrimination in employment and labor
unions had occurred to a higher degree than anyone in the community wished to admit.
Policemen did have different attitunps toward the hlacks ~s a group than thpy did
toward the whites, despite all protestations to the contrary by the Police Chief.
Bigotry and prejudice combined to build almost unsurmountable walls that surrounded
the Hough ghetto and stymied the advances of the entire black community~
The traditional American dream of upward mobility through rugged individual-
ism was a sham for the black citizen of Cleveland. For other minority groups, assi-
milation into society has depended only on modification of their traditional cultural
and behavioral patterns. The black people have not been so fortunate. Black people
must also overcome the barrier of prejudice in their efforts to win full equality.
The wall~ ur th~ Huu~h ghetto were erecced by a white society with power both
to confine those who had no powe~ and to perpetuate the inherent powerlessness of
thAt community. A~ Kenneth Clark explained, the ghettos that have emcrgcd arosc
as "social, political, educational, and -- above all -- economic colonies. Their in-
habitants are subject peoples, victims of the greed. cruelty. insensitivity, guilt
and fear of their masters.~85
The people of Hough, by either their violent actions or quiet acquiescence to
the destruction, rebelled against the authority that trapped them in the ghetto,
They rebelled against the conditions of their existence. They rebelled against
raclsm~
Cleveland had indeed moved toward two societies, one blac~, one white -- very
separate and very unequal. Divisive forces were neither recognized nor heeded by
the community. Disorder was the ultimate consequence, and so Hough burned.
The initial impact of the violence only he18htened the $ame dlvlalve forcea.
Only time would reveal the final significance of the disorders. The new awareness
in the white community of thp hlack ehprto'~ prohl~ms was mpt n~ad-one by reaction
to the means of destruction which had produced that new awareness~ Progress hinged
on the outcome of that encounter.
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v. EPILOGUE; HOUGH AFTER THE RIOTS
Little change came to Hough in the months following the disorders of the 1966
summer. As a result, the spring of 1967 saw the area inundated with newspaper re-
porters and journalists, all ur whum drew similar conclusions •• Hough was go1ng
to burn again that summer. Many of the city's residents also expressed such fears,
and only hoppd that the violence would not spread to outlying areas. The white com-
munity demonstrated a fatalistic attitude of helplessness and did not act construc-
tively to stem the tide of frustration in the ghetto.
The physi cal appealance of Hough di d not change from its appearance of the pre-
vious summer. The burned-out and vandalized buildings provided an atmosphere of eVen
greater desolation than before. The vacant structures served to further intensify
the wasteland appearance of the entire area, and little repair had been done on
buildings damaged in the disorders. Overflowing garbage cans still lined the streets
accompanied by the unpleasant sight of underclothed and underfed children. Violence
and crime continued after the riots throughout the rest of the year. Three white
grocers were murdered in the ghetto, and robberies increased by 300%. Fire bombings
occurred sporadically, and in Apcil, teenagecs ~mashed some store windows in a twenty-
block area of Hough. Between September and March, fifty-nine teachers were assaulted
in schools in the npig~borhood. Drop-ou~ and unemployment rateS continued to be the
highest in the city, and welfare payments stayed below the poverty existence level.
The Police Department still employed only one hundred and fifty Negroes on the 2100
man force, and the urbgn renewal program remained ineffective. City leaders still
found the conditions of the neighborhood deplorable, but no massive effort to improve
these conditions was launched. In the words of one writer, Hough had "been Hough for
one more year."l
Violence and disorder were predicted by everyone. Bertram Gardner joined the
Cassandra-like chorus by predicting that the violence of 1967 would be worse than in
1966. He advocated that the city's best course of action for Hough would be flto tear
down the whole section. n2
Most observers and residen~3 recognieed that there was s~ill very little cummuni-
cation between the ghetto and the political leadership, and the local government con-
tinued to be rather unresponsive to the needs of the ghetto. Mayor Ralph Locher re-
mained unempathetic and insensitive to the problems of the black people. When Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr. announced that Cleveland was to be a summer project of his
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and that he personally planned to visit Cleve-·
land, Locher was asked if he planned to meet with Reverend King. He responded that he
would not meet with any nextremists."3 The urban renewal funds for new projects were
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formally cut off to Cleveland in January, 1967. The city's urban renewal efforts
were also hampered by personal disagreements between Locher and Ralph Besse, chair-
man of the Inner-City Action Committee. Besse offered Locher help in the area of ur-
ban renewal on the condition that Locher would appoint the Vice-Chairman of the
Inner-City Action Committee to be Urban Renewal Director. Locher refused the offer
and help, and So Besse severed relations with Locher, claiming, "The causes (of the
problems in Cleveland) are to be found primarily in the inadequacies of executive
personnel and almost complete lack of (administrative) coordination. H4
A few token gains were achieved during the year. Frlvate organlzat1ons such as
HOPE (Housing OUr People Economically) and others succeeded in renewing some of the
deteriorated housing in the area, And th~ city put in new and brish~cr street light-
ing throughout the Hough area. Garbage was collected more frequently, and some new
training and employment programs were initiated. For example. the Cleveland Economic
Opportunity Office established a program called AIM-Jobs. The program was designed to
actively seek the unemployed and guarantee them good jobs with advancement opportuni-
ties once they completed the training. Each trainee was to have a "coach" in the pro-
gram who helped him along. and a specially assigned ufriend" in his first job. To
e11m1nate early discouragement, those persons who failed the program in their first
attempt were placed in the nex~ group of trainees. 5 However, the gains that were
made were only a fraction of what was needed 1n the clty, and so predictions of sum-
mer violence and destruction proliferated.
Lewis Robinson said that a peaceful summer in Hough depended on many things. Co-
operation from City Hall and the Chamber of Commerce, success of the efforts of Mar-
tin Luther King to obtain concessions, and a complete program for the developmQnt of
the NegroUs life in Cleveland were tne prerequisites for a "cool summer" in Cleveland
according to Robinsono ttlf all these things happen," Robinson said, "then I'll be out
there on the streets telling the kids, 'Cool it. cool it baby. We'll be there in a
couple of years.'tt6 But prospects appeared grim.
Fred A. Evans, a black nationalist leader in Hough, known as Ahmed to his follow-
ers, predicted racial violence for May 9, to coincide with a scheduled eclipse of the
~un. As the date for the riots approached, the city braced in anxious anticipation,
but when the predicted "doomsday" arrived. mass violence did not occur. However, the
day was not without a comic incident. Some detectives of the c1ty broke into the edi-
torial offices of the Cleveland~ Dealer, looking for NBC cameramen who supposedly
knew where the riot was ioing to start.' Police algo broke into Ahmcd'o aatrological
headquarters in Hough but did not discover anything. There were no riots t and the
residents of Cleveland breathed a collective Sl~h of relief. grateful that th~y wpr~
spared the inevitable for the time being.
The summer of 1967 witnessed the worst series of civil and racial disorders in
the history of the United States. Forty-one serious incidents of civil disorder erupt-
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ed across the country, resulting in almost one hundred deaths and property losses
totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. Relations between blacks and whites in
America had reached a crucial point in history, and President Lyndon Johnson appoint-
ed an Advisory Commission to study the causes and possibJe solutions of the many civil
disorders. However, despite the many predictions of violence for the summer months,
despite the violence and destruction that occurred widely around it in all parts of
the country, and despite the fact that conditions had hardly improved in the ghetto,
Hough did not explode again o
The explanatio~ behind the cool summer in Cleveland was not a very complex one.
State Representative Carl Stokes had once again decided to run far Mayor of Cleveland.
To win election in the fall, it was necessary for Stokes, a Negro, LO receive more
than just the black votes. About twenty~five per cent of the white voters of Cleve-
land would have to cast their ballots for Stokps to give him a majority, assuming
that the black votes were unanimously cast for him. Any disorder or eruption in
Hough, therefore, would have greatly diminished StokesO chances of being elected the
first black mayor of a major metropolitan city. As a result~ civic leaders of the
black community, neighborhood leaders throughout the ghetto, and youth organizations
combined to spread the word to "cool it for Stokes." Even leaders like Ahmed Evans
participated in this effort to keep the ghetto from exploding, and it worked very
well. Some In~ldents that could have become precipitants for disorder were quickly
extinguished, and the hotter individuals were soothed by many farsighted blacks who
IDOk~d ahead to the fall clcction. 8
Much of Cleveland's white "establishment" finally realized that the ineffective
and inefficient Locher administration had allowed the city to slide into a sad state
of disrepair. Consequently, many of the industrial leaders of the city gave their
influential support to Stokes, and he was also endorsed by the Cleveland 'lain Deal-
~, the daily morning newspaper. The~, the afternoon paper, merely came out
against Locher, and thus for either one of his challengers in the Democratic pri~
mary Frank Celeste, the former mayor of a western suburb who had moved into the
city to run for mayor (and who had been told that he would receive the Press' en-
dorsement), or Representative Stokes. With the help of these sources of white sup·
port and a solid block organization of the black vote, Stokes swept to victory in
thp OctobQr prilll4ry to receive the Democratic party nomlw:H.lon.
The only remaining obstacle between Carl Stokes and the mayor~s office was the
Republican challenger, Seth Taft. Cleveland had a strong Democratic tradition, and
Stokes showed great strength in the opinion polls, but the possibility remained that
Taft would gain enough white support to nip Stokes in the final election. As the cam-
paign Closed, it appeared that Taft had gained Some strength, and final public opinion
polls showed the contest to be a toss-up.9
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November 7, 1967 was an historic day in Cleveland and the country. Aided by a
turnover of over ninety-five per cent of the regi~tered voters in the black wards,
while polling almost twenty-five per cent of the white vote, Carl Stokes slipped by
Seth Taft into the office of Mayor of Cleveland. When all the returns were in, they
showed Stokes with 50.1% of the vote against Taft~s 49.91.. 10 Pandemonium engulfed the
black sections of Cleveland that night, for it was a victory long in coming. The de-
lirium subsided after a few days, and the community settled back to observe the
Stokes administration go to work.
Mayor Stokes encountered some trouble at the beginning of his administration. First,
his early appointments showed that he was going to repay his political debts promptly.
One of his major appointments was the inexperienced thirty~one year old son of the
president of a large Cleveland bank ~ho had avidly supported Stokes' campaign. Then
lat~.l.', WLlt:::ll hI:::: W<:i5 vacdtluulng 114 f\~,t::l·to Rico, a~ reporter di&covercd that Stokes'
Executive Secretary was also the secretary of a neighborhood illegal bar. She was im~
mediat~y fired by th~ Mayor from nis vacation spot without his hearing her side of
the story, although many observers hinted that Stokes had known the information all
along. Both events cost Stokes some support within the black community, and the sec-
ond incident cost Stokes some respect from both whites and blacks for opPOSite reasons.
The whites were upset about the nscandal H that had been uncovered so early in the ad-
ministration, while the black community was disturbed by the way in which the incident
\Jas handled o
Hough still did not change mucho The people living there awakened each morning
with their deplorable conditions unaltered. At Christmas of 1967 Hough did not show
many decorations, and the area still appeared desolate and despress1ng. Signs of new
construction and renewal appeared sporadically in the neighborhood, but boarded up
buildin8~ ~nd vacant lot~ cast a 8100my pall over th~ entire arp80 ll
After a few months, the Stokes administration began achieving some of its promised
goals. Police were ordered to crack down in arrests involving prostitution by arresting
the male participant as well as the female. Such action was ordered to help eliminate
the vice from the streets of the ghetto, and to answer some of the criticism that had
previously been directed at the Police Department o Mayor Stokes also succeeded in re-
newing the flow of federal funds for urban renewal projects, although one cynical ob-
server had wri tten that Stokes could have submi tted his requests for cash f'on Cheerio
box tops" and had them "exped! tiausl:; approved ... l2 A new urban renewal director was
attrscted by raising the pay to a le"el higher than that of l.h~ Mayor, <:inu the appoint-
ment of Richard Greene, an urban expert from Boston, was welcomed by the city as a
positive step toward improving the lagging urban renewal effort. Re~~nt studi~s also
showed that some Hough residents were moving out to the suburbs, an opportunity never
before afforded the ghetto's residents. As the Stokes administration entered its
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sixth month, the outlook for the black people of Cleveland was very encouraging.
Some black leaders were less optimistic about the future. Lewis Robinson thought
that Stokes' major contribution would only be a psychological one, showing black
children that the American dream might still come true. 13 Wendell Erwin, president
of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, thought that Stokes had made some progress so far by working within the sys-
tem. He believed, however, that substantial gains for the black community would have
to wait until ttthe establishment died out. Hl4
Progress was being made, though, and its momentum seemed to increase every day
of the new administration. It appeared that the election of Carl Stokes would benefit
the entire City of Cleveland, and especially its black residents. Assuming that
Stokes' election would be an asset to the black community and to Hough specifically,
it i~ clear that the di50rder~ of 1966 played an important role in the progress of
the black people.
The riots affec~ed Cleveland's whi~p "ps~ablishment" in two different ways. First.
by increasing the white awareness of the ghettogs problems, the riots and subsequent
events demonstrated effectively that the Locher administration had neither the fore-
sight nor the competence to deal with the pressing problems of the city. Secondly,
the industrial and financial leaders were concerned that violence and disorder would
erupt in Cleveland again, posing a serious economic and financial hazard for capital
i~vestrnent throughout the entire city. The election of Carl Stokes would increase
the competence and responsiveness of the city government as well as lower the prob-
ability of future racial disorder. For these reasons, influential business and civic
leaders threw their support behind Stokes' candidacy. Many vther liberal whites
followed the same course of aetion~
The support of the white leaders was crucial, however. to Stokes' succ~ss in the
election. Without their endorsement, it is doubtful that he would have received the
necessary twenty~five per cent of the white vote that made him a winner. Thus, the
Hough riots aided directly in Stokes' election.
Had the conditions of Cleveland been different, the city's black citizens would
not have gained as much in the long run o If the civic and business leaders had not
been perceptive enough to see the need for change, the city would have made little
progress, if any. If the administration in power when the disorder erupted had been
slightly more responsive and understanding, the white leadership would have been
less likely to support the candidacy of Mayor Stokes, resulting in the sacrifice of
long range gains for the Negroes for short term concessions from a white, moderate
mayor. And if the black community had not been so united and orsanized, it is doubt-
ful that Stokes would have won. Thus a combination of newly enlightened civic leader-
ship, an inept incumbent city government. and a unified and organized black community
produced the environment that led to the election of Carl Stokes and the possibility
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of man~ long term gains for the black citizens of Cleveland.
Tragically, a riot had been necessary to moVe the City of Cleveland to action •
. '
The election of Carl Stokes began a new and brighter period in the history of
Cleveland, OhiO. Th~ events of July, 1966, hastened the end of an earlier and
more frustrating era.
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rostscript
As the l~st words of this thesis were being written, a bullet in Memphis, Tenn-
essee, tragically ended the life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The nation, shocked
and bereaved by the savage murder, waS swept by a wave of violence that descended
upon scores of cities in the wake of Dr. KingQs death. Cleveland, however, stayed
"cool."
As the news of the tragedy spread, Mayor Stokes walked and drove through the pre~
dominantly black sections of Cleveland, pleading for calm in the restless city. Vis-
ibly shaken by the assassination because of their close personal friendship, Mayor
Stokes delivered a moving eulogy the follOWing day to an overflow gathering at a memo-
ial service in the Old Stone Church. Later in the day, Stokes hUddled with black
nationalist leaders in an effort to maintain calm. The efforts at keeping the peace
succeeded in Cleveland. At a lime when more than one hundred cities eKperlenced mass
disorders of some sort, Cleveland ~as conspicuous as the only major urban center that
rp~ain~d qUie~. The calm had not resulted from para-military efforts orthrough rQ-
pressive measures. Instead t the peace was maintained primarily through the efforts
of Mayor Stokes and black leaders of the community, people who had regained some of
their lost faith in the system of democracy. They were able to demonstrate to the
dissident black residents that they had a very real stake in the decision-making
appara tus of Ci ty Hall.
The episode following Dr. Klng 9 s assassination heralded a change in Mayor Stokes
and his administration. Until this time the new mayor had appeared somewhat unsure
of himself, groping blindly sometimes for nonexistent solutions; now he projected
an lnfectious new self confidence in his own ability to lead the people of Cleveland
toward solutions of their great problems. He now seemed to become the dynamic and
vibrant leader that was nece5sary to move the community ahe~d. Thus, the assassina-
tion of Dr. King marked the beginning of a new period in the leadership of Carl
Stokes.
In the ensuing months new ideas, new plans, and new programs were suggested and
implemented by the Mayor and his administration. Incorporating an idea of his oppo-
nent in the previous election, Mayor Stokes began holding cabinet meetings in various
neighborhoods around the city in an ef60rt to move government "closer" to the people.
On April 26, the Mayor announced the formation of the Mayor's Council on Youth Oppor-
tunity 'rograms, a group whose function would be to find and create jobs for the youth
of Cleveland.
FinallYt on May 1. Mayor Stokes unveiled plans for a broad new program to combat
L!Ie urban ills ot Cleveland. Entitled "Cleveland8 NoW!," the plan called for the ex-
penditure of $177,000,000 for rehabilitation, urban renewal, economic development t
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job training and job placement -- an attempt to attack the cycle of poverty from
many directions. The money for "Clevelandg No'Wlff was to come primarily through the
federal government ($143,000,000) if the city could raise $11,250,000 from private
sources and pledge an additional $22,750,000 of state and: local governmeru. funds.
The innovative experiment combini~g the resources of various levels of government
'With resources from thp private sector of the economy was lauded by many community
leaders~ Editorial support of the plan poured forth from both newspapers, and it
became quite evident thlt Cleveland was taking a progressive step toward establlsh~
ing new institutions and programs to rebuild the citYo Symbolic evidence of the
Widespread support for "Cleveland: Now!'· came in the form of a $1000 contribution
to the program from two merchants whose salvage business had been completely destroy.
ed in the Hough disorders two years earlier.
Mayor Stokes continued to exert dynamic leadership in other areas. At the polls
in the May primary, the voters of Cuyahoga County approved four issues that had
b,-,'-'l1 5trungly endorsed by t.he Mayor. These measures provided for the establishment
of a Port Authority, more buildings for mentally retarded children, and a renewed
as well as an increased Co~nt:l Wcl£a.rc levy" "Cleveland; Nowl n continued to gain
popular and financial support, especially when it was announced that a private dona-
tion of one million dollars had bpRn given to the program anonymously. Mayo~ StokQS
had united Clevelandqs divergent forces into common action with the plans for
"Cleve land: Nowl,f
Late in May some tension developed between the Mayor and City Cou~cil over the
Mayor's recommendation of an income tax hike from ~'7. to 1,.., Although the propostOd
rate increase received wide support from many sources, the Council was reluctant
to raise taxes, primarily because it feared the image of being "pressured" into
enacting legislation. However, yielding to economic realities as well as persua-
sion from the Mayor, the Council finally passed the tax hike on JuntO 10 with only
three members votin~ against Lhe measure.
The summer arrived optimis~ical1y for most Clevelanders. The Mayor had dramati~­
c.'llly demonstrated that. he could keep Cleveland "cool," new pro~ramS were being im-
plemented that pushed Cleveland to the forefront among progressive cities, and the
long-dormant tndians appeared to have a chance to win the pennant. BlOW cultural at-
tractions and programs in the inner city brought a new dimension to life there, and
some people almost forgot that violence had flared in the city only two years before.
The night of July 23 brought the entire city crashing down into reality again.
In Glenville, another of Cleve13nd~s East Side neighborhoods, a group of heaVily
armed men suddenly opened fire on an unarmed police towning crew. The group, com-
posed chiefly of militant black nationalists and ostensibly led by the renowned
FrtOQ "Ahmed" Evans, did not stop .~hooting until ten persons had died, including
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three white policemen and a black civilian shot while trying to rescue a police-
man. The ten~e East Side once again cottered on the brink of widespread ciVil diS-
order. Some looting and arson followed the attack on the policemen on Tuesday night,
forcing Mayor StokGG to ask for the NQtionnl c...ard as (:I precauti,onAry meel>\,lre~ The
following night, with the city anticipating the worst violence, Mayor Stokes took
the unprecendented and controversial action of removing all white police and guards-
men from the Glenville and Hough areas to positions on the periphery of the neigh-
borhoods. After meeting with black leaders for much of the day, Stokes had decided
to allow the black leaders to assume the responsibility of maintaining calm in the
area. Only black policemen were allowed in the cordoned-off zone in a move calcu-
lated to avert the further loss of human lives.
The daring move by Stokes was successful. Although vandalism and looting occur-
r!'!d to a moderate degree, there were no more deaths that night. By Thursday it appear-
ed that the crisis had passed, although Mayor Stokes ordered a curfew for the area Bnd
sent the National Guard and all pollee back into the troubled area in an effort to
curtail further vandalism and lootingo
Many unanswered questions lingered after the brief period of violence that served
to tarnish the bright image of Mayor Stokes as well as some of his new programs, de-
Spi te his courageous handling of the sf tuation o A reporter discovered that "Ahmed"
Evans had received "Cleveland: Now!" money to establish a black cultural center but
that some of the money allegedly had been used to purchase weapons for the Tuesday
night encounter. The method of distributing the funds came under severe criticism,
even though other such efforts had been successful in the past. The police also
claimed to have had prior knowledge of the armS cache of the black nationalists,
but that orders from City Hall had prevented them from taking any action before the
violence broke out. The actual facts of the circumstances surrounding the event
were not readily available.
The police and other embittered sections of the community openly criticized
the Mayor and his actions during the crisis. However, a broad cross section of com-
munity leaders w~re persuaded to rally to support the Mayor's handling of the situa-
tion, and it seemed that any damage to Mayor Stokes or his programs was not irrepa~­
able.
As the Summer entered its final month, the black community no longer remained
unified behind Mayor Stokes. A small and violently militant faction had given up
on the system and sought to destroy it, but their actions appeared to be of a dif-
ferent nature than those that had characterized the Hough disorders of 1966. However,
a segment of the black com~Jnity. convinced that present institutions were not flexible
enough to produce significant and lasting change, remained skeptical of Mayor Stokes
and hiS attempts to effect change within the system. Others, though, recognized the
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innovative and exciting spirit that had permeated the city since Stokes' election
and retained their faith in the democratic process. There is little doubt that this
new brand of leadership will be increasingly necessary in the future if the cities
are to survive.
Contemporary history never qUite catches up to itself, Analysis ages qUickly
in the rapid cycle of human affairs, and the future is impossible to foresee. The
administration of Mayor Stokes has met with both success and failure during its
brief tenure. However, its greatest success so far, as demonstrated by Stokes'
handling of the Glenville violence, has been to reseore hope and faith to Cleveland
and to prOVide the bold and aggressive leadership required to cope with the severe
problems of the urban centers. SUIrE wrong Lurn::> have been taken and some efforts
have been made to impede its motion, but the City of Cleveland is at last moving
down thp track~ toward progress. A return trip won't be necessary,























































Median • 22 yrs.
Average - 25 yrs.
Source: Compiled from newspaper accounts, July 25-August 2, 1966.
Appendix 12
Suburban Statistics
SUBURBS HA \IE MORE LAND, HIGH INCOME FAMILIES
AND PEOPLE, BUT FEWER JOBS AND NON-WHITES
Suburbs Central City
Total land area 89'7. 11'7.
Family incomes above
Metro Area's Median 657. 35%
Total population 567- 447.
Jobs 28% 72%
Area's non-wh.ites 3% 97%
Sour~@.: Hearing before ~ United StAtes ~­
mission ~ £!Y!l Rights, April 1-7,
1966, p. 205. (Figures from 1959-60).
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Appendix (})
Percentage change in racial balance
for each tract in Hough:
% Black
Tract 1960 1965 Incrp.RSp.
L-l 57.:3'r. 78.6'7. +21.3
L-2 80.5 93.4 +12.9
L-3 83.8 93.1 + 9.5
L-4 91.3 97.0 + 5.7
L-5 88.8 95.3 + 6.5
L-6 88.6 97.7 + 9.1
L-7 64.0 70.9 of' 6.9
L-8 68.0 88.0 +20.0
R..6 69.7 83.7 +14.0
R-9 43.9 74.9 +31.0
Total 73.7 87.9 +14.2
Source: Computed from Bureau of the Census,
"1960 Census," and "Special Census
of Cleveland, Ohio, April, 1965,"




Police Response to Calls
5th Di strict 1st Di strict 2nd District
Calls Av. Response Calls Av. Response Calls Av. Response
(min.) (min.) (min. )
Misc. Folice Service 1,492 13.7 714 8.5 996 9.3
Traffic Accidents 144 16.0 102 7.0 137 10.1
Larceny 54 18.8 36 15.2 38 10.2
Burglary & Housebreaking
with Larceny 33 19.3 11 8.0 14 17.4
Burglary & Housebreaking
s/O Larceny 22 20.1 10 8.5 9 4.5
Criminal Homocide 7 3.4
Assault and Battery 58 11.8 10 13.5 17 7.3
Robbery 24 12.0 1 1.0 21 2.9
Rape 2 6100 1 4.0
Auto Thefts 44 22.4 14 8.5 20 5.8
Disorderly Conduct 23 29.0 8 9.4 20 15.8
Drunkenness 20 15.7 15 4.5 22 13.4
All Others 29 11.0 4 9.3 19 10.9
Totals 1,952 14.6 926 8.6 1,313 9.5
































































































BASIC CHURCH i'LANNING :iTUDIE:i
1960 THE CHURCH 18 A CHANGING NEIGHBCRHOOD
1960 fLAN.'fIi1G FOR PROTESTANTISM IN IN1l:RURBlA
1961 fLANNING FOR PROTESTANTISM IN N'ORmEAS!ERll LORALi
CClJNTY
1961 PLANNING FOR PRoTESTANTISM 0:1 CLEVELMm'S NEAR
WEST SIDE
1961 URBAN RENEWAL AND 'ruE CHURCH
1961 TIlE CHUROI m SuUTHWES'fERl'l AKRON
1961 1>LANNIJ:iC FOR PRoTESTANTISM IN CEAUCA COll:'JTY
1961 THE CHURCH AND PUBLIC HOUSING
1961 THE CHURCH IN KENT
1961 THE CHURCH L1 GLENVILLE
1961 THE CHURCH L~ UNIVERSITY-EUCLID
1961 PLt\NNL1G FOR PROTESTANTISN IN LAKE COUNTY
1962 MH1UIIL REPORT FOR NINETEEN SIXTY-O:J'E
1962 TIlE CHURCH IN A CHANGING SUBURB
1962 pLANNING FOR PRO'IESTANTISN n BATH-RICHFIELD
1962 THE CHURCH l~ CLARK-DENISON
1963 CHURCH RELATED HOUSING PRuJECTS
1963 AN:ruAL REPORT FOR NINETEEN SIXTY-TWO
1963 SU8URBA~IZATIO:-l OF THE NEGRO POPULATION
1963 mE CHURCH U AKRON
1964 THE CHURCH O~~ LEE ROo6lD
1964 ANNUAL REPORT FOR NINETEE~ SIXTY-TIIREE
1964 fL.A;'iin~'fG FOR PRQTESTANTISI-1 Ll NORTHER;'~ SUi'1MIT CO.
1964 RACE A~D POVERTY
1964 k'LAN~nr;~ FOR .PROTESTAI-JTISM I!'J SOUTHERN S1Jl.1MIT o.
1964 PLMmL'1G FOR pROTESTANTISM tN t-lEDlNA COUNTY
1965 ANNUAL REPeR! FoR NVl'ETEEj SIXTY-FOUR
1965 THE CHURCH IN WOODLAND HILLS
1965 WE LUTHERAN CHURCHES OF NORTIiEASTER;{ OHIO
1966 NEW CHURCHES IN NORTHEASTERN OOLO
1966 THE CHURCH IN LAKEWOOD
1900 ANNUAL REPC8t FOR NIJ.~ETEEN SUTY-FIVE
1966 TRENDS AFFECTING NEW CHURCH DEVELCi'MENT
1967 COOPERATIVE Mll'l't::H"iUES
1967 CHURCH BUILDING
1967 ArVlUAL REP~T FOR NINETEEN SIXTY-SIX
1967 METHODIST SALARY STUDY
1967 QRG'NIZING FOR MIS:)Ia.~
1967 THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE
1967 THE CCMING CRISIS. IN NEW CHURCH DEVELOfMENT
1968 WHO JOINS A NEW MISSION?
1968 ANNUAL REPORT FOR NINETEEN SIXTY-SEVEN
1968 THE HOUGH RIOTS OF 1966
1968 ECCLESIASTICAL BOUNDARIES
1968 COLLI~OOD REVISITED
1968 PLA~W'l'G FOR Tor-l0RROW'S CHURCH L~ QJYA~!A
1968 TIi~ cnURCtiES Ol'f CLEVELAN'D':3 ~E3T SIDE
C.P •
(J.P.
a.!?
O.P.
O.F.
O.P.
O.P.
O.f'.
U.l'.
D.P.
~4.00
$2.00
$5.00
$2.00
$4.00
0.1'.
~2.00
0.1'.
$7.00
$2.00
$2.00
$5.00
0.;> •
$3.00
$3.00
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00
~2.00
$4.00
~Z.OO
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$2.00
$1.00
~2.00
$2.00
$2.00
$3.00
$2.00
$2.00
$3.00
$2.00
$3.00
$3.00
